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1 
Sovereignty, Accountability, and the Wealth Fund Governance Conundrum 
Anna Gelpern  
 
Abstract 
Sovereign wealth funds—state-controlled transnational portfolio investment vehicles—began as an 
externally imposed category in search of a definition.  SWFs from different countries had little in 
common and no particular desire to collaborate.  But SWFs as a group implicated the triple challenge of 
securing cooperation between deficit and surplus states, designing a legal framework for global capital 
flows, and integrating state actors in the transnational marketplace. This Article describes 
how an apparently artificial grouping of investors, made salient by the historical and political 
circumstances of their host states in the mid-2000s, became a vehicle for addressing some of the hardest 
policy problems of the past century and a site for innovation in international law-making and institution-
building.   I argue that the funds‘ hybrid public-private and transnational character makes them hard to 
define and govern, but also makes them exceptionally apt reflections of contemporary global finance and 
its multiple constituents.  I elaborate this character in a four-part accountability matrix.  The task of 
governing SWFs, just like the task of governing global finance, is about negotiating among public, 
private, internal and external demands for accountability in the absence of a stable hierarchy among them. 
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2 
Sovereignty, Accountability, and the Wealth Fund Governance Conundrum 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The lingering financial crisis has created an opening for reform in national regulation and global 
economic governance.  The Group of Twenty rich and middle-income states (G-20) has 
seamlessly edged out the Group of Seven rich ones (G-7) as the indispensable forum for 
economic policy coordination.
1
  Long-defeated ideas, from regulating derivatives to a global 
reserve currency, are surfacing in polite conversation and the occasional communiqué; some are 
on the brink of legislative reality.
2
  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has reinvented itself 
after a near-death experience,
3
 successfully fighting off competition from new regulatory fora 
and regional power groupings.
4
  Yet at the heart of reform are three pieces of unfinished 
business, some dating back to World War II and the Great Depression:  securing cooperation 
between deficit (debtor) and surplus (creditor) states, designing a legal framework for global 
capital flows, and integrating state actors in the transnational marketplace.   
                                                 
1
 See G-20, Summit Declaration, The Toronto Summit 2010, ¶ 1 (26-27 June 2010), available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_declaration_en.pdf G-20; see also G-20, Leaders' Statement, The Pittsburgh 
Summit 2009, ¶ 19 (24-25 Sept. 2009), available at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm 
(Item 19, designating the G-20 ―the premier forum‖ for international economic cooperation for the first time); see 
also The Commission of Experts of the President of the UN General Assembly on Reforms of the International 
Monetary and Financial System, Recommendations, ¶ 47 (19 Mar. 2009) (arguing for a "new Global Reserve 
System"). G-7 members are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Japan and Italy. The 
G-20 adds South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, China, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, 
Turkey, Australia and the European Union. But see Anders ASLUND, Editorial, The Group of 20 Must Be Stopped, 
THE FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 27 Nov. 2009, at 11 (arguing that G-20 is illegitimate). 
2
 See Sewell CHAN, Reconciliation for 2 Financial Overhaul Bills, N.Y. TIMES, 21 May 2010, at B1 (reporting the 
passage of a Senate bill including provisions for derivatives regulation).  The Restoring of American Financial 
Stability Act of 2010, S. 327, 111th Cong. § 8(2) (2010); S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 
REP. NO. 111-176 (2010) (Conf. Rep.). 
3
 Barry EICHENGREEN, The IMF Adrift on a Sea of Liquidity, in REFORMING THE IMF FOR THE 21
ST
 CENTURY 495 
(Edwin M. TRUMAN ed., 2006)[hereinafter, TRUMAN, ED.]; see Anthony FAIOLA, IMF to Offer Buyouts to 
About 500 Employees, WASH. POST, 30 Apr. 2008, at D8 (reporting staff cutbacks). 
4
 See, e.g., G-20, Communiqué, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, (23 Apr. 2010), 
available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/201004_communique_WashingtonDC.pdf  [hereinafter G-20 
Washington Communiqué] 2-3 (concerning cooperation between the IMF and Financial Stability Board); Tony 
BARBER, EU Ditches Doubt to Back IMF Role, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 3 May 2010 (describing Europe‘s 
initial desire to resolve its financial crisis without the IMF); Press Release, Executive Board of the IMF, IMF 
Executive Board Approves €30 Billion Stand-By Arrangement for Greece, No. 10/187 (9 May 2010); Full Text of 
EU Crisis Mechanism Agreement, REUTERS, 10 May 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6490A820100510 (establishing an EU financial support mechanism in 
cooperation with the IMF); see generally C. Randall HENNING, Regional Arrangements and the International 
Monetary Fund, in REFORMING THE IMF FOR THE 21
ST
 CENTURY 171 (Edwin M. TRUMAN ED., 2006) (discussing 
the IMF's relationship with regional arrangements). 
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Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) embody all three unfinished tasks.  They are state-controlled 
portfolio investment vehicles that deploy surplus state capital in deficit countries, where they 
face political opposition and a shifting legal environment.  This Article explores the place of 
SWFs in the current reform moment.  I argue that SWFs, which began as an externally imposed 
category in search of a definition, gained prominence in part because, as a group, they stand at 
the intersection of so many urgent governance concerns at once.  Figuring out how to govern 
SWFs may yield substantive policy pay-off—engaging surplus states, advancing broad-based 
norms on cross-border investment, and regulating state participation in the financial markets—
and help elaborate new legal, institutional and governance models for the global financial system 
beyond SWFs. 
 
Sovereign portfolio vehicles grew dramatically over the past decade, reaching an estimated $3 
trillion under management in just a few years.  Yet, as I highlight in Part II of this Article, SWFs 
as a category emerged under protest from the funds themselves.  SWFs‘ governments, friends 
and many observers argued that lumping the funds together in one term made no sense.  SWFs 
are so diverse that commentators have yet to agree on a single authoritative definition.  They 
come from all continents, from all along the national income spectrum, and are sponsored by all 
manner of governments.  They adopt a variety of legal forms, some of which translate poorly 
across legal systems.  They have different goals and investment strategies:  some seek to smooth 
volatile commodities profits, some save for future generations, yet others just want to earn more 
on official reserves.  It is a puzzle that despite such diversity, the term SWF stuck, and soon a 
political grouping arose to fit the term.  This Article sets out how it happened, and suggests some 
implications of the episode for global economic governance. 
 
In addition to the diversity among them, SWFs harbor internal tensions.  Most SWFs are state-
owned actors in state-dominated economies; yet when they go abroad, they claim forcefully to 
act as if they were private firms.  Many funds come from countries that had been on the margins 
of the global financial system, and some are very poor; they invest most visibly in rich countries 
that had long dominated this system.  SWFs are often compared to hedge funds and private 
Draft July 19, 2010 
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4 
equity funds—private players at the cutting edge of international finance5—but when they invest 
in Europe and North America, SWFs elicit fears of state interference and political capture.
6
  In 
sum, they are complex and contradictory institutions that occupy a critically important policy 
space. 
 
I discuss the policy context for SWFs‘ emergence in Part III of this Article.  I suggest that SWFs‘ 
stint at the center of policy debates is another puzzle, even putting aside the grouping‘s apparent 
artificiality and its internal contradictions.  Despite recent growth, SWFs remain far behind 
official reserves and a small fraction of private mutual funds as sources of global investment 
capital.
7
  Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are much more overt in projecting state 
power across national borders.
8
  It follows that those concerned with imbalances between surplus 
and deficit countries might more profitably focus on reserve accumulation and management;
9
 
those worried about capital mobility, on private investment funds; those worried about foreign 
direct investment and state control, on SOEs.  Put differently, if size and activism were proxies 
for importance, SWFs might be described as a secondary symptom of some big policy problems.  
But even if SWFs were not the leading exponent of any single policy worry, they have shown a 
rare capacity to reflect multiple worries at once. 
 
I argue further that SWFs‘ hybrid character has helped capture public, market and official 
imaginations even after it turned out that early size estimates were overblown, and despite the 
funds‘ record of relatively passive investment so far.  Unlike the more explicitly public or private 
                                                 
5
 McKinsey Global Institute, The New Power Brokers: How Oil, Asia, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity Are 
Shaping Global Capital Markets (Oct. 2007) [hereinafter, McKinsey NPB 2007] (describing a new category of large 
global liquidity providers). 
6
 Infra note __ and accompanying text. 
7
 See Brad SETSER & Rachel ZIEMBA, How Much Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Manage?, 2 Aug. 2009, 
http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2009/08/02/how-much-do-sovereign-wealth-funds-manage/ (estimating total sovereign 
wealth fund assets at $1.5 trillion, substantially less than the $7 trillion held as reserves); John GIEVE, Deputy 
Governor of the Bank of England, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Global Imbalances, Speech at the Sovereign Wealth 
Management Conference (14 Mar. 2008) in Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (2008 Q2) at 198 (estimating SWF 
holdings at "less than one 20th" of private sector investment funds). 
8
 See e.g., Lydia POLGREN, As Chinese Investment in Africa Drops, Hope Sinks, THE N.Y. TIMES (25 Mar. 2009) 
(describing Chinese SOE investment in Africa); Anders ASLUND, Focus on Gazprom, Not Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, MOSCOW TIMES (8 Nov. 2007) (noting interference in European politics by the Russian SOE).  The term 
SOE traditionally refers to operating companies, as distinct from portfolio investment vehicles.   
9
 This view is implicit in BRAD W. SETSER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH AND 
SOVEREIGN POWER (2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/17074 [hereinafter ―SETSER REPORT‖].   
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5 
vehicles such as reserves or mutual funds, SWFs must respond to simultaneous and conflicting 
demands from many diverse constituents in today‘s international finance.10  I illustrate these 
demands in Part IV of this Article, and suggest that SWFs embody tensions in the system as a 
whole in ways that more ―pure‖ participants with fewer and more discrete constituencies cannot.  
For example, when they operate as private actors, SWFs answer to their immediate owners and 
creditors, and have responsibilities to their targets and host state regulators.  At the same time, 
SWFs are state actors that must be broadly accountable to the people of their home country,
11
 
and are subject to a wide range of international legal norms, including treaty commitments of 
their home states.
12
  Capacity to negotiate overlapping private and public, domestic and external 
demands for accountability is essential for a regime that aspires to govern a global marketplace 
where capital roams free and radically diverse actors and political systems transact side by side 
with little regard for territorial boundaries.  The international financial system responds to 
multiple constituencies and multiple legal regimes at once.  SWFs‘ experience in managing the 
demands of this plural order in the absence of a settled hierarchy offers a valuable window on 
how international finance is governed. 
 
How SWFs go about this task is as important as the outcome.  Early proposals for formal rules 
and sanctions to govern SWFs have produced minor changes in domestic law, whose effect has 
been uncertain.  These gave way to artifacts of soft law such as nonbinding principles, private 
―naming and shaming‖ indices, informal alliances and ―soft institutions‖—voluntary fora that 
lack legal personality.  Most important among these, the nonbinding Generally Applicable 
Principles and Practices announced by a group of SWFs in Santiago in mid-2008 (GAPP, or the 
Santiago Principles)
13
 have since led to the creation of a standing SWF forum.
14
  Part V of this 
                                                 
10
 See Larry Catá BACKER, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares, 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, 82 TULANE LAW REVIEW 1801, 
1804 (2008), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1135798 [hereinafter BACKER, 
Private Law of Public Law] (arguing that the boundary between public and private functions in the marketplace is 
breaking down); Larry Catá BACKER, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons:  The Norwegian 
Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private Global Investment, 41 GEORGETOWN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (2010) [hereinafter BACKER, Regulatory Chameleons]. 
11
 The form of accountability is a domestic political matter.  See note __ infra and accompanying text. 
12
 See Simon CHESTERMAN, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment from Multinational Corporations for Human 
Rights Violations—The Case of Norway's Sovereign Wealth Fund, 23 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
REVIEW 577, 584 (2008) (discussing Norway's use of multilateral treaties in its SWF investment policies).  
13
 Generally Accepted Principles and Practices, International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, October 
2008, [hereinafter Santiago Principles or GAPP] available at http://iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm. 
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Article reviews the public and private, formal and informal efforts to discipline SWFs, which 
culminated in the Santiago Principles.  These efforts were dynamic and interactive, borrowing 
one another‘s insights and methods, and competing for market and political space. 
 
There are several explanations for why soft measures have prevailed in SWF governance so far; 
these lead to different predictions about their likely success and different implications for 
governing international finance.  At one extreme, if SWFs chose a voluntary code to boost the 
public perception of their law-abiding character with no intention to comply, then the code may 
be useless at best or help cover up anti-social behavior at worst.
15
  On the other hand, if soft law 
gives SWFs a way to negotiate the demands of diverse legal and political systems, then it can 
help create a site where new actors engage with the existing order.  With the Santiago Principles 
barely two years old, it is too early to choose between these explanations; the answer is likely in-
between.  But even if the second explanation is only partly right, the evolution of SWFs is a 
valuable case study of soft law as a response to the pluralism of law in international finance, and 
an experiment in new governance techniques. 
 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part II briefly elaborates the SWF phenomenon and the 
struggle to define it.  I argue that defining SWFs has been hard for a reason:  they are, by 
definition, many things to many people, which is also what makes them fertile ground for 
governance research.  The remainder of the Article situates SWFs at three intersections:  the 
intersection of substantive economic policy problems, the intersection of accountability 
demands, and the intersection of legal and institutional approaches.  Thus Part III puts SWFs in 
the context of three policy imperatives:  securing cooperation between surplus and deficit states, 
the search for global investment norms, and integrating state actors in the financial markets.  Part 
IV considers the competing demands on SWFs among their different constituents, and groups 
them along four dimensions of accountability using case studies to illustrate.  Part V describes 
                                                                                                                                                             
14
 Press Release, International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Working Group Announces Creation of 
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, No. 09/01 (6 Apr. 2009) available at http://iwg-
swf.org/pr/swfpr0901.htm. 
15
 Stephen S. COHEN & J. Bradford DELONG, THE END OF INFLUENCE:  WHAT HAPPENS WHEN OTHER COUNTRIES 
HAVE THE MONEY 4 (2010) (‖The great and the good seek codes of behavior that aim to oblige sovereign wealth 
funds—in a nonbinding way—to pretend that they are market actors . . . .‖) 
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7 
the legal and institutional response to these demands.  Part VI concludes with implications for 
governing global finance and further research in the field. 
 
II. Identity Politics 
 
This much is agreed:  Kuwait established the first SWF in 1953;
16
 SWFs grew dramatically in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century;
17
 Andrew Rozanov first used the term ―sovereign 
wealth fund‖ in 2005;18 and there is no universally agreed definition of SWFs.19  Estimates of 
their number and size are usually contested by those who define the category differently.  
Leading estimates range from about 70-80 funds managing about $4 trillion in international 
assets in 2009
20
 to less than half this number and amount.
21
  Continued struggles to define SWFs 
are among the oddest and most telling attributes of their recent history.   
 
Rozanov, an economist with a private investment firm, first described SWFs in the negative as 
―neither traditional public-pension funds nor reserve assets supporting national currencies.‖22  To 
constitute a SWF, a pool of funds would have to be managed separately under guidelines distinct 
from those applicable to central bank reserves, to achieve ―more broadly diversified and risk-
tolerant sovereign wealth.‖23  Nearly three years later, the IMF‘s first major public product 
dedicated to SWFs had an appendix-full of formal definitions, highlighting the magnitude (or 
                                                 
16
 See, e.g., GIEVE, supra note 7. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Andrew ROZANOV, Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?, 15 CENTRAL BANKING JOURNAL 52 (May 2005). 
19
 EDWIN M. TRUMAN, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS:  THREAT OR SALVATION? (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter, 
TRUMAN, THREAT OR SALVATION]. 
20
 Id.  Truman‘s estimates are at the high end of the spectrum because his definition of SWF includes government-
controlled pension funds. 
21
 See, e.g., Weathering the Storm:  Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Global Economic Crisis of 2008, Monitor Group-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, SWF Annual Report 2008 (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter, Monitor 2008].  The Monitor-
FEEM definition includes government ownership, independent management, a diversified investment strategy ―in 
pursuit of commercial returns‖ and significant publicly-reported international investments, but excludes funds that 
have ―predominant explicit pension obligations.‖  Id. at 7.  The result is a list of 31 funds with $1.8 trillion under 
management.  Id. at 6. 
22
 ROZANOV, supra note 18, at 1. 
23
 ROZANOV, supra note 18, at 1, 4. 
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8 
futility) of the classification challenge.
24
  Universally shared SWF characteristics were limited to 
state control and macroeconomic purpose.
25
 
 
Disagreements reflect the competing concerns of definition proponents.  The SWF category was 
launched in 2005 entirely as seen from the outside, and initially developed unconstrained by the 
self-perceptions of the funds‘ owners and managers.26  Early ―definers‖ fell roughly into three 
groups:  market actors whose business was affected by the rise of SWFs;
27
 host country 
governments managing the political fallout from SWF investments;
28
 and academic and civil 
society observers engaged in policy advocacy.
29
  The three groups used the term ―sovereign‖ to 
emphasize different things.  Thus for market participants, sovereign often meant autonomous, 
somewhat insulated from market pressures, and therefore freer to take longer-term risks;
30
 for 
host country governments, sovereignty stood for responsible public behavior;
31
 and for the civil 
                                                 
24
 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS—A WORK AGENDA 37–38. (29 Feb. 2008) 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf.  The Fund had previously included analysis of 
SWFs in its macroeconomic and country surveillance work.  See, e.g., generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (Apr. 2007). 
25
 Id. at 4, defining SWFs as ―government-owned investment funds, set up for a variety of macroeconomic 
purposes.‖ 
26
 David LAWDER & Gleb BRYANSKI, Putin-No Sovereign Wealth Fund in Russia Yet, REUTERS (30 June 2008) 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/etfNews/idUSL3028241920080630 (describing a misunderstanding between 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson surrounding Russia‘s definition 
of SWF). 
27
 See Stephen JEN, Currencies: The Definition of Sovereign Wealth Fund, Morgan Stanley (25 Oct. 2007), at 
http://sovereignwealthfunds.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/the-definition-of-a-sovereign-wealth-fund-morgan-
stanley-october-2007.pdf; ROZANOV, supra note 18; McKinsey NCB 2007, supra note 5.   
28
 See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND 
EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES (Dec. 2007) available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/economic-
exchange-rates/; Clay LOWERY, Acting Under Secretary for International Affairs, Remarks on Sovereign Wealth 
Funds and the International Financial System, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 21 June  2007, at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp471.htm.  (Lowery reprised the formal definition in the Report to Congress, 
and elaborated on it several times in the summer and fall of 2007). 
29
 E.g., Edwin M. TRUMAN, A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices, Policy Brief (Peterson Institute 
for International Economics), Apr. 2008, available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb08-3.pdf 
[hereinafter TRUMAN, Blueprint]; SETSER & ZIEMBA, supra note 7; COHEN & DeLONG, supra note 15. 
30
 See, e.g., ROZANOV, supra note 18; JEN, supra note 29.  Jen‘s SWF characteristics are: ―(1) sovereign, (2) high 
foreign currency exposure; (3) no explicit liabilities; (4) high risk tolerance; and (5) long investment horizon.‖  Id.  
Risk tolerance is quite different from responsible investing in the preceding paragraph.  A risk tolerant investor can 
wait to maximize returns; a responsible investor may sacrifice financial returns for a higher purpose. 
31
 See, e.g., Robert M. KIMMITT, Public Footprints in Private Markets:  Sovereign Wealth Funds and the World 
Economy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan./Feb. 2008), available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87109/robert-m-kimmitt/public-footprints-in-private-markets.html 
[hereinafter KIMMITT, Public Footprints]; Clay LOWERY, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury Assistant Secretary for 
International Affairs,  The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Global Economy, Remarks at Barclays Capital‘s 
12th Annual Global Inflation-Linked Conference (12 Feb. 2008), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp836.htm [hereinafter Lowery Role of Sovereign]. 
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society observers, it could imply a fiduciary relationship with the people or some subset 
thereof.
32
 
 
While not part of any formal definition of SWFs, perceptions of their ―sheer size and scope‖ 
drove policy and market interest.
33
  A big reason SWFs mattered was that as a group, they 
looked big and grew fast.  In just a few years, SWFs grew from a few million to nearly $3 trillion 
in assets under management (not including state pension funds), surpassing hedge funds; early 
on, they were expected to triple in five years.
34
  The highest estimates were probably unrealistic 
all along; regardless, the financial meltdown has tempered the trend substantially:  many funds 
lost money on investments, and some governments had to dip into SWF savings to manage the 
crisis.
35
  Nevertheless, and despite their continued lagging behind reserves and mutual funds, 
SWFs‘ combined size by most definitions and estimates made SWF policy a matter of global 
financial stability.   
 
As noted earlier, SWF sponsors first reacted to being thus combined with bewildered 
indignation.  For them, the term ―sovereign wealth fund‖ purported to describe competitors with 
little in common, most of which had not interacted (much less collaborated) until they became 
the target of host country hostility.  SWFs come from rich European states like Norway, and 
new, impoverished, conflict-ridden ones like Timor Leste, with the likes of Abu Dhabi, Alaska, 
Azerbaijan, Botswana, Chile, China, Russia and Singapore in between.  Every continent and 
form of government is represented, though relatively few SWF home states conform to Western 
                                                 
32
 See, e.g., TRUMAN, Blueprint, supra note 29; Sven BEHRENDT & Bassma KODMANI, Eds., Managing Arab 
Sovereign Wealth in Turbulent Times—and Beyond, Carnegie Papers No. 16 (Apr. 2009) at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23044&prog=zgp&proj=zie,zme. 
33
 ROZANOV, supra note 18, at 1. 
34
 See, e.g., Nandini SUKUMAR, Sovereign Wealth Fund Assets Could Triple by 2013, BLOOMBERG (23 July 2008), 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601014&refer=funds&sid=a.GQvK6z8x8g;  JEN, supra 
note 29; see also Lawrence GOODMAN & Georgia BLUME, Sovereign Wealth Funds:  Future Direction, 
Opportunities and Uncertainties, Bank of America Global Currency Strategy Report (31 Mar. 2008). 
35
Brad SETSER & Rachel ZIEMBA, GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds:  Reversal of Fortune, Council on Foreign 
relations CGS Working Paper (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter SETSER & ZIEMBA, Reversal], available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18017/; Rachel ZIEMBA, Are Sovereign Wealth Funds Back? A Roundup (8 Oct. 
2009), available at http://www.roubini.com.  But see McKinsey Global Institute, The New Power Brokers:  How 
Oil, Asia, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Are Faring in the Financial Crisis (Jul. 2009) [hereinafter McKinsey 
NPB 2009] (citing no decline in SWF assets under management, at $3.2 trillion for 2008, and projecting continued 
albeit slower growth).  
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notions of representative democracy.
36
  Some funds have decades of investment experience, but 
more than half are brand new.
37
  Their stated goals vary widely, from basic macroeconomic 
policy to long-term development.  Some invest at home, others abroad; many do both.
38
  Sources 
of funds range from export revenues to foreign aid inflows.
39
  Some SWFs invest net government 
savings, others borrow from their central banks; very few borrow from the markets. 
 
Not until late 2008, as the Santiago Principles were unveiled at the height of the financial crisis, 
did a group of SWFs proffer their own definition, which effectively set forth criteria for 
membership in the new club: 
SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the 
general government.  Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, 
SWFs hold, manage or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of 
investment strategies which include investing in foreign financial assets.
40
 
 
This definition specifically excluded traditional reserves, SOEs, purely domestic funds, and 
pension funds.  It retained for SWF states the flexibility to organize the funds as they saw fit 
under domestic laws, and left unaddressed the tension between ―macroeconomic [=public policy] 
purposes‖ and ―financial [=apolitical] objectives‖.41  Nor did it formalize the funds‘ role as 
passive long-term portfolio investors, an aspect of SWF history that the funds and their 
supporters had stressed to relieve host anxiety. 
 
Reading between the lines of SWF definitions and commentary reveals a jumble of 
contradictions:  public money that pledges to act private, vast pools of capital that promise not to 
move markets, non-controlling investors that manage centrally controlled economies; and public 
fiduciaries that balk at corporate governance of their investment targets.  The next Part tries to 
                                                 
36
 See, e.g., Ashby H.B. MONK, Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate:  Trust, Legitimacy, and 
Governance, 14 NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 451 (2009). 
37
 See, e.g., John LIPSKY, First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund at the seminar, 
Sovereign Funds: Responsibility with Our Future organized by the Ministry of Finance of Chile (3 Sept. 2008), text 
as prepared for delivery available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/090308.htm.  This figure is 
somewhat misleading, since many of the new funds are small.  The large funds tend to be older. 
38
 See, e.g., Arina POPOVA, Sovereign Wealth Funds: To Be or Not To Be Is Not the Question; Which One To 
Choose, Is, 40 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1191, 1198 (2009) (describing Russia‘s diverse 
SWFs). 
39
 ROZANOV, supra note 18, at 1. 
40
 GAPP, supra note 13, at 27. 
41
 Id. 
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make sense of the SWF phenomenon by locating it at the intersection of long-festering policy 
arguments. 
 
III. Unfinished Business 
 
From the start, SWFs emerged as exponents of intractable policy problems.  These problems 
were historically distinct, if often related.  Each had its political constituents, legal and policy 
tool kits.  This Part elaborates three especially long-running and prominent substantive policy 
debates associated with SWFs, and how SWFs got caught up in their simultaneous inflections 
around the middle of the 2000s. 
  
A. Asymmetry and Imbalance   
 
By first describing a typical SWF as ―a by-product of national budget surpluses … trade and 
fiscal positions,‖42 Rozanov located SWFs at the heart of an old controversy that had become, 
again, the defining economic policy preoccupation of its day. 
 
John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, the architects of the post-World War II 
economic order, both said that stability and growth depended on getting deficit and surplus 
countries to act in the common interest.
43
  Although both aspired to symmetry, they came to the 
negotiating table with different mandates.  Keynes sought to create an international institution 
with the power to force deficit countries to adjust, but also to tax countries that accumulated 
excess reserves, pressuring them to revalue.
44
  Influential voices in the U.K. argued that ―outright 
confiscation of excess balances‖ was needed to make the new fixed exchange rate system 
workable.
45
  Because everyone expected the United States to be the biggest creditor of all, U.S. 
                                                 
42
 ROZANOV, supra note 18. 
43
 JOSEPH GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1981), 259-60. 
44
 Id. at 260.  According to Keynes, ―[t]he object is that the creditor should not be allowed to remain entirely 
passive.  For if he is, an intolerably heavy task may be laid on the debtor country, which is already for that very 
reason in the weaker position.‖  J. M. KEYNES, quoted in id.  See also J. KEITH HORSEFIELD, ANNALS OF THE 
FUND, 1945-1965 (1969) at 15, 31, 38, 40. 
45
 HORSEFIELD, supra note 46, at 31, citing E.F. SCHUMACHER, The New Currency Plans, INSTITUTE OF 
STATISTICS BULLETIN (Oxford, England), Vol. 5, Supp. 5 (7 Aug. 1943) at 17. 
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negotiators opposed aspects of the Keynes proposal that would impose such muscular sanctions; 
they preferred reports and reprimands.
46
   
 
The compromise Articles of Agreement of the IMF permit sanctions against surplus countries in 
limited circumstances.
47
  However, the relevant provisions are narrowly drawn and have never 
resulted in punishment.
48
  As a practical matter, the Articles gave the IMF powers to condition 
balance-of-payments support on policy adjustment in deficit countries, even as it could only 
lecture the capital hoarder.
49
  Yet deficit country sanctions are also incomplete:  members that 
can finance their deficits without recourse to the Fund need not submit to its discipline.
50
 
 
The asymmetric discipline compromise reflected and entrenched the post-war order, as did the 
IMF‘s formal governance structure.  Voting was tied to contributions, which were tied to the size 
of the members‘ economies, trade volumes and exchange reserves, adjusted for the day‘s 
politics.
51
  Changing the formula significantly to realign the votes at a minimum would be a 
major political event, and could require a high supermajority of member votes and approval by 
national authorities.
52
 
                                                 
46
 HORSEFIELD, supra note 46, at 23, 45, 65; GOLD, supra note 45, at 296-97. 
47
 The so-called ―Scarce Currency Clause,‖ Article VII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund allows the Fund to designate a currency as ―scarce‖ either in general or in the context of the Fund‘s own 
holdings.  A finding of scarcity would authorize other members to use bilateral sanctions against the surplus state.  
In addition, Article IV(1)(iii) of the Articles of Agreement states that members shall ―avoid manipulating exchange 
rates . . . in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage . . . 
.‖ 
48
 GOLD, supra note 45, at 296-97, 301-02.  Keynes considered the U.S. agreement to sanctions under the scarce 
currency clause a major achievement.  Id. at 296.  However, even significant surpluses did not necessarily result in 
currency scarcity under the Articles; moreover, members were reluctant to authorize sanctions because apportioning 
blame for scarcity was both empirically and politically difficult.  For the contemporary relevance of the scarce 
currency clause see Eric HELLEINER, The Contemporary Reform of Global Financial Governance:  Implications 
of and Lessons from the Past, G-24 Discussion Paper No. 55, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (Apr. 2009). 
49
 GOLD, supra note 45, at 260, 294-303; Barry J. EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION, 1919-1939, 398 (1995).  
50
 EICHENGREEN, supra note 3 at 495.  See also GOLD, supra note 45, at 262.  This is particularly true of 
members whose currencies could function as ―reserve currencies‖ for the rest of the world.  The U.S. dollar has been 
the dominant (and until recently the only) reserve currency in the post-war era. 
51
 The arrangement reflected the U.S. imperative ―that [the formula] should yield a quota of about $2.5 billion for 
the United States, about half this for the United Kingdom, and such figures for the U.S.S.R. and China as should 
assure them third and fourth places, respectively . . . .‖  HORSEFIELD, supra note 46, at 74. 
52
 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. III(2) (requiring eighty-five percent of the voting 
power to change member quotas); Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512, Sec. 5 
(codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) (requiring congressional authorization to change the U.S. quota). 
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A quarter century later, post-war assumptions had failed.
53
  The United States suffered a 
succession of capital outflows and declining exports, and could not sustain its role as the world‘s 
monetary anchor.  In August of 1971, it notified the IMF that it would no longer convert the 
dollar freely into gold.
54
  This marked the end of the dollar-centered fixed exchange rate system 
at the heart of the postwar institutional design,
55
 and the rise of informal coordination 
arrangements to underpin floating exchange rates.
56
  Since then, the United States trade deficit 
has worsened,
57
 so that by 2005—the year the term ―sovereign wealth fund‖ first appeared in 
print—the United States was far and away the world‘s biggest debtor.58   
 
Unlike earlier U.S. and European deficits, which were financed by private investors and 
governments in closely allied states such as Germany and Japan,
59
 the new deficits were bigger 
and relied more on funding from China, Russia, and oil producers in the Middle East.
60
  And in 
contrast to the world in 1944, many capital-exporting states were poor and new to governing 
international finance.  The new creditors accumulated trillions of dollars from export revenues in 
an effort to self-insure against future shocks and avoid IMF discipline, but also to keep down the 
value of their currencies.
61
  Experts said that the enormous imbalances put the world in peril:  
                                                 
53
 Some commentators have argued that the system only worked as designed for a much shorter period of nine years 
(1959-1968).  Peter M. GARBER, The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System, in MICHAEL 
BORDO & BARRY EICHENGREEN, EDS., A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM:  LESSONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM, 461 (1993). 
54
 Id.; MARGARET GARRITSEN DE VRIES, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1966-1971, vol. 1 (1976) 527-
529; GOLD supra note 45, at 268; KENNETH W. DAM, RULES OF THE GAME (1982). 
55
 GARRITSEN DE VRIES, supra note 56, at 530. 
56
 See, e.g., Andrew CROCKETT, International Institutions, Surveillance, and Policy Coordination, in Jacob A. 
FRENKEL & Morris GOLDSTEIN, Functioning of the International Monetary System, vol. 1 (1996) 60-82.  The 
Group of Seven wealthy industrial states were a prime exponent of this new muscular informality. 
57
 International Economic Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis (29 May 2010 1:45:47 PM), 
www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#bop (estimating fourth-quarter 2009 current account deficit at $115 billion). 
58
 See, e.g., William R. CLINE, Preface to The United States as a Debtor Nation, at xi (2005); International 
Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Statistical Appendix, at 3, fig. 1, April 2010. 
59
 See, e.g., C. Fred BERGSTEN & C. Randall HENNING, Global Economic Leadership and the Group of Seven 
50, 60-61, 64 (1996). 
60
 Compare U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Table, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, Mar. 2010, 
http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt (showing large-scale participation of China and oil-exporting states in the U.S. 
Treasury market); and U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Table, Historical Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, Apr. 
2010, http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfhhis01.txt (showing China's holdings increase from $60 billion in 2000 to about 
$900 billion in 2009).   
61
 See Eswar PRASAD, Raghuram RAJAN, & Arvind SUBRAMANIAN, The Paradox of Capital, Fin. and Dev., 
Mar. 2007, at 1. 
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rebalancing was inevitable, and would require painful adjustment for debtors, creditors, and 
bystanders alike.
62
 In response, creditors blamed spendthrift debtors and debtors accused 
creditors of mercantilist manipulation.
63
 
 
Formal Bretton Woods structures and informal mechanisms grounded in economic and political 
alliance, such as the G-7, were at a loss to deal with this shifting direction of capital flows.
64
  
Asian exporters, notably China and Singapore, and a number of oil producers, notably the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), were under-represented in the IMF.
65
  Russia‘s status in the G-7 finance 
circles was provisional at best.
66
  Meanwhile, the world‘s biggest debtor continued to dominate 
international institutions and issue the leading reserve currency, which gave it policy autonomy 
from the IMF.  The dire warnings and the circle of blame brought about no visible change in 
behavior on either side.
67
  The IMF could no more influence China‘s exchange rate management 
than U.S. tax policy. 
 
Thus by 2005, the Bretton Woods compromise that rejected institutionally robust, symmetrical 
discipline on surplus and deficit countries was coming back to haunt its leading proponent in an 
unexpected, ironic way.  The United States avoided IMF policy discipline imposed on the likes 
of South Korea during the Asian financial crisis ten years earlier, because the private market 
                                                 
62
 See Olivier BLANCHARD & Gian Maria MILESI-FERRETTI, Global Imbalances:  In Midstream? IMF Staff 
Position Note SPN/09/29 (Dec. 22, 2009) (including figure showing absolute values of current account balances).  
For prominent warnings, see Maurice OBSTFELD & Kenneth ROGOFF, The Unsustainable US Current Account 
Position Revisited (Nov. 30, 2005); Nouriel ROUBINI & Brad SETSER, The US as a Net Debtor:  The 
Sustainability of the US External Imbalances (Nov. 2004). 
63
 See, e.g., Harold JAMES, A Blame Game at Globalisation‟s Unravelling, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 27 
May 2010 (criticizing the politics of global and intra-European imbalances). 
64
 See also Steven DUNAWAY, Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis, Council on Foreign Relations Special 
Report No. 44 (Mar. 2009) at 7-10, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/18690. See generally Eric 
HELLEINER, International Payments Imbalances and Global Governance, CIGI Policy Brief No. 8 (Nov. 2008) at 
2.   
65
 Edwin M. TRUMAN, Rearranging IMF Chairs and Shares: The Sine Qua Non of IMF Reform, in TRUMAN, 
ED., supra note 3, at 214.  
66This was so despite Russia‘s participation in the G-8 Heads of State forum.  See, e.g., Carnegie Endowment for 
Int‘l Peace, Russia as the Chairman of the G-8, (21 Sept. 2005), available at, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0921carnegie.pdf; Mark MEDISH, Russia—Odd Man Out in the G-8, 
GLOBALIST (24 Feb. 2006), available at  
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18063 (discussing Russia‘s tenuous 
position).  
67
 See, e.g., Morris GOLDSTEIN, Currency Manipulation and Enforcing the Rules of the International Monetary 
System in TRUMAN, ED., supra note 3, at 141; Timothy D. ADAMS, The IMF:  Back to Basics in TRUMAN, ED., 
supra note 3, at 133; EICHENGREEN, supra note 3. 
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continued to fund the United States . . . except that surplus country governments, which now 
included South Korea, became an indispensable part of the ―private‖ market for U.S. government 
debt.  The same U.S. official who had, in a prior life, argued for robust IMF programs in crisis-
stricken countries in Asia,
68
 would soon return to Asia on a reassurance tour of America‘s 
creditors.
69
  On the other hand, having deliberately deprived the IMF of meaningful leverage 
over surplus countries, the United States had to face the frustration of being the largest 
shareholder in what increasingly looked like an irrelevant institution.
70
 
 
The sharp spike in the number of SWFs in the 2000s was a symptom of global imbalances, 
which the existing order looked powerless to address. The number of funds had always grown in 
spurts reflecting rising export revenues, especially in oil and other commodities.
71
  It is just that 
the latest spurt was enormous.  As before, surplus country holdings initially took the form of 
central bank purchases of U.S. Treasury and agency securities.  Over time, they began moving 
into riskier, less liquid assets,
72
 such as U.S. and European equities, as well as infrastructure and 
extraction projects in Africa.  New investment strategies begat new institutional forms: SWFs 
became a prominent source of portfolio investment in G-7 economies. 
  
  
  
  
  
                                                 
68
 See PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND 
HUMBLED THE IMF (2001) at 137. 
69
 Preview:  Geithner to Reassure Gulf Allies on Dlr Assets, REUTERS, Jul. 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/asianCurrencyNews/idUSLC35935520090713; China Skeptical about Geithner 
Message, AMERICAN PUBLIC MEDIA, 1 June 2009, available at 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/06/01/pm_geithner_in_china/.  
70
 BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND‘S 2007 DECISION OF SURVEILLANCE OVER MEMBERS‘ 
POLICIES 2 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/82808report.pdf.   
71
 GIEVE, supra note 7, at 197. 
72
 Joshua AIZENMAN & Reuven GLICK, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Governance, and Reserve Accumulation, VOX, 
16 Jan. 2009, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2799; see also Joshua AIZENMAN & Reuven GLICK, 
Sovereign Wealth Funds:  Stylized Facts About Their Determinants and Governance 27 (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 14562, 2008) (finding that once foreign reserves become large, SWFs 
become more attractive to their sponsors).  For an example of prominent advocacy for reserve diversification, see 
Lawrence H. SUMMERS, Harvard University, Reflections on Global Account Imbalances and Emerging Markets 
Reserve Accumulation, L.K. JHA Memorial Lecture, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, India (24 Mar. 2006). 
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B. Local Fears and Global Failures 
 
SWFs flared up in host country politics between the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the 
financial collapse of September 2008.
73
  The term SWF, introduced as a technical description, 
entered mainstream vocabulary as a rolling reflection of host country fears:  the fear of foreign 
invasion, the fear of state takeover, the fear of debt, the fear of big money, and the fear of 
irrelevance.  Chameleon-like, SWFs had the capacity to evoke color-coded security alerts, Wall 
Street‘s desperate hunt for capital, the failure of financial regulation, and massive concentration 
of wealth in the hands of governments that the hosts had long regarded with deep suspicion.  
 
Perhaps the most curious thing about this turn of events was that few of the early public anxieties 
about SWFs were triggered by entities now defined as SWFs.  In the United States, the SWF 
debate erupted on the heels of mishandled attempts by SOEs, operating companies from the 
Persian Gulf and China, to buy into U.S. oil and port facilities, which raised the specter of 
strategic takeover by un-democratic, anti-market, and potentially unfriendly states.
74
  When 
Dubai Ports, an SOE from the United Arab Emirates, bid for a British firm that operated U.S. 
ports, U.S. media reports highlighted the fact that two of the 9/11 hijackers came from UAE.
75
  
And even those who said there was no reason to oppose the acquisition of Unocal by China‘s 
state oil company noted its state-run economy and its status as creditor to the U.S. government.
76
  
In the United States and Europe, SWF controversy also followed an inflection of concern with 
―private pools of capital‖ (hedge funds and private equity),77 to which SWFs were often 
compared.  The ―pools‖ were large, fast-growing privately owned investment vehicles that often 
                                                 
73
 ROZANOV, supra note 18. 
74
 Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, CFIUS and the Protection of the 
National Security in the Dubai Ports World Bid for Port Operations (24 Feb. 2006), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js4071.htm.  
75
 Documents Show Conditions for Dubai Deal, MSNBC (Feb. 22, 2006), available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11494815.  
76
 Is CNOOC‟s Bid for Unocal a Threat to America? Knowledge @Wharton, 21 Nov. 2005, 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1240 (last visited 31 May 2010).  
77
 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, President‘s Working Group Releases Common Approach to Private 
Pools of Capital (22 Feb. 2007) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp272.htm; Ashley SIEGER, 
Germany Pledges Code to Regulate Hedge Fund „Locusts,' THE GUARDIAN, 19 May 2007, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/may/19/germany.internationalnews. 
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had short time horizons, profited from market volatility,
78
 and took an increasingly active role in 
managing their investments.  Although they had the capacity to transmit risk through the 
financial system, they seemed impervious to regulation.
79
  In sum, in the public imagination 
SWFs looked big, hostile, and uncontrollable, if only by analogy. 
 
From the perspective of SWFs and their supporters, host country critics were being willfully 
ignorant at best, protectionist and bigoted at worst; regardless, they ―had the wrong guy.‖  To be 
sure, SWFs were large and state-owned.  But most SWFs, unlike SOEs, refrained from active 
management of their targets.  In contrast to hedge funds and private equity, SWFs were ―patient 
capital.‖  Their long investment horizons promised to stabilize volatile markets even where their 
strategies were more aggressive than those of traditional reserve managers.
80
  By 2008, 
opponents of sovereign investment also stood accused of biting the hand that fed them:  SWFs 
were among the scarce few sources of funding for the tottering financial sector in New York and 
London.
81
 
 
Such arguments were no more effective than protestations of SWF diversity discussed earlier.  
SWFs struck a raw nerve in investment host states at a particularly vulnerable time.  Calls for 
new foreign investment restrictions came naturally, framed in terms of sovereignty and national 
security,
82
 in tandem with the equally predictable protests against protectionism.
83
 
 
                                                 
78
 Id.; see also Interview with Rob Johnson, Frontline, ―The Crash‖ (1999), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crash/interviews/johnson.html (describing ―currency attacks‖ that 
drew attention to hedge fund investment strategies in the late 1990s). 
79
 The President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Report, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-
Term Capital Management  (28 Apr. 1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf 
(reporting on the systemic impact of one hedge fund‘s near-failure in 1998, but arguing against direct regulation). 
80
 See, e.g., Mohamed A. EL-ERIAN, Towards a Better Understanding of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Presentation at 
the Peterson Institute for International Economics 7, 19 Oct. 2007, available at 
http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/papers/el-erian-on-truman.pdf.  SWFs‘ long time horizons also 
distinguish them from traditional central bank reserve managers, for whom liquidity is paramount. 
81
 See, e.g., Steven SCHWARTZMAN, Reject Sovereign Wealth Funds at Your Peril, THE FINANCIAL TIMES 
(London), 20 June 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/405b8888-3dff-11dd-b16d-0000779fd2ac.html. 
Henry M. PAULSON, U.S. Treas. Sec‘y, Statement at the International Monetary and Financial Committee Meeting 
(20 Oct. 2007) available at http://www.imf.org/External/AM/2007/imfc/statement/eng/usa.pdf. 
82
 Evan BAYH, Time for Sovereign Wealth Rules, WALL STREET JOURNAL, 13 Feb. 2008, at A26. 
83
 DAVID M. MARCHICK & MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, GLOBAL FDI POLICY: 
CORRECTING A PROTECTIONIST DRIFT 10 (2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/16503/. 
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The U.S. investment regime reflects a compromise between openness and national security, 
shaped in large part by the last influx of petrodollars in the 1970s and a wave of Japanese 
acquisitions in the 1980s.
84
  Against the presumption of openness, the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in the Executive Branch decides whether an investment 
poses a national security threat.  Where it does, CFIUS recommends changes or blocks the deal.  
The Dubai Ports bid was the biggest test for this compromise in the new financial and security 
environment, where economic imbalances and terrorism fears ran rampant.
85
  CFIUS allowed the 
acquisition; public outrage framed the legislative response, and colored the subsequent debate on 
SWFs.
86
  CFIUS went from obscurity to celebrity overnight.
87
  It became an emblem of the 
controversy over sovereign investment, a prominent early site of the policy battle, and inspired 
imitators around the world.
88
  By the summer of 2007, a new law in the United States made 
minor tweaks to the open investment framework established in the 1980s, to reflect national 
security concern about foreign government investments in general; however, policy focus then 
turned to SWFs in particular—perhaps reflecting heightened awareness of the many forms and 
implications of sovereign investment, growing worries about macroeconomic imbalances and 
financial stability, and above all a need to preempt more damaging political surprises.
89
  Eager to 
avoid new legislative restrictions, U.S. Administration officials preached transparency and made 
SWFs promise to act commercially.
90
  Other hosts went through similar debates.
91
 
                                                 
84
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, available at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/  (last visited 27 June 2008) (includes summaries and links to 
the relevant statutes). 
85
 Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, supra note 77. 
86
 MSNBC, supra note 75 (also notes that two of 9/11 hijackers came from UAE). 
87
 See Editorial, Heavy-handed CFIUS, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 28 Feb. 2007, at 16, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/656f55d4-c6d0-11db-8f4f-000b5df10621.html (arguing that previously obscure CFIUS must 
consider commercial necessities). 
88
 A description of CFIUS authority and activities is available on the website for the United States Department of the 
Treasury. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 86.  MARCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 85 
(describing a global protectionist trend in investment regulation). 
89
 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (―FINSA‖), Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246  (amending 
§ 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (―DPA‖)).  The amendment included stricter requirements for state-
controlled investments.  For an overview of U.S. legislative perspectives on SWFs, see Martin WEISS, Sovereign 
Wealth Funds and the United States Congress, in MALAN RIETVELD, ED., NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOVEREIGN 
ASSET MANAGEMENT (2008). The U.S. Treasury hosted a G-20 meeting on SWFs in May 2007, before FINSA‘s 
passage, and Treasury officials began publicly speaking on the subject in June.  LOWERY, supra note 28.  See Press 
Release, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treas., Under Sec‘y for Int‘l Affairs David H. McCORMICK Testimony before the Joint 
Economic Comm. (13 Feb. 2008) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp823.htm. 
90
 See, e.g., KIMMITT Public Footprints, supra note 31; LOWERY, Role of Sovereign, supra note 31; U.S. 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. FACT SHEET:  FOURTH CABINET-LEVEL MEETING OF THE 
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The dominance of domestic law early in the SWF controversy was partly attributable to another 
piece of unfinished international business:  the failure to reach multilateral consensus on 
investment norms in the 1990s.  Rich states in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) tried and failed to produce a global investment treaty a decade before 
global imbalances in general, and SWFs in particular, attracted attention.  The OECD was then 
the leading broker of global investment norms.  But it faced growing criticism as an exclusive 
club dominated by wealthy capital exporters in Europe and North America.
92
  Negotiations of the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) collapsed for lack of domestic and international 
legitimacy, under pressure from civil society groups and states on the economic and political 
periphery that felt shut out.
93
  At the time, the United States and Europe saw themselves 
primarily as investors, not investment hosts.  In retrospect, this crisis of OECD legitimacy 
foreshadowed the power shifts to come.  Since MAI failed in 1996, the OECD has struggled to 
recover credibility in the investment field;
94
 meanwhile, the task of regulating investment capital 
flows fell to domestic laws, bilateral treaties, and industry codes of conduct. 
 
Yet pointing to old and new domestic laws did not lay the SWF controversy to rest in host states, 
while the benefits of bilateral treaties remained uncertain.
95
  The security-protectionism 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC ECONOMIC DIALOGUE 2-3 (18 June 2008), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/sedusfactsheet.pdf.  
91
 MARCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra note 85, at 7-12; Guy DINMORE, Italy Set to Curb Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 21 Oct. 2008, at 10.  In Europe, the SOE investment concerns were 
heightened by Gazprom‘s actions; these in turn helped exacerbate worries about SWFs.  E.g., ASLUND, supra note 
8. 
92
 See James SALZMAN, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions:  The Role and Influence of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 769, 776 (2000) (arguing the the OECD is a 
"Rich Man's Club," allowing an open forum for wealthy nations to ignore developing nations); see also Katia 
TIELEMAN, The Failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the Absence of a Global Policy 
Network, Case Study, U.N. Vision Project, 16 (2005) available at 
http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Tieleman_MAI_GPP_Network.pdf (tracing the history of the MAI and NGO 
complaints of exclusion); Ward MOREHOUSE, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: An International 
Human Rights Crisis, 2 Dec. 1997, available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/25/043.html (calling the 
OECD a rich man's club imposing its will on nonmembers). 
93
 Organization for Economic Co-Operation & Development, Multilateral Agreement on Investment, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1894819_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 27 June 2008).  
Contains negotiation history and document links. 
94
 Id. 
95
 See supra note 31 (statements by U.S. officials); see also Edward F. GREENE & Brian A. YEAGER, Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: A Measured Assessment, 3 CAPITAL MARKETS LAW JOURNAL 247 (2008); Paul ROSE, Sovereigns as 
Shareholders, 83 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 102 (2008) (describing the considerable  domestic law safeguards 
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argument continued unabated; the financial crisis exacerbated host fears of dependence on 
foreign governments, but also fears of financial loss on the part of SWF home states.
96
  SWF 
sponsors saw the continuing controversy as both an economic and a political threat.  To the 
people at home, SWFs stood variously for economic security, political autonomy and global 
prestige.  Even in states where the masses had little knowledge or influence over how public 
money was invested, governments could lose face by making too many concessions to host 
country fears, not to mention by losing money.
97
  In the end, SWFs turned out to be bigger than 
the national security-open investment quarrel attending their rise. 
 
C. State Commerce Revisited 
 
As investors, SWFs fit uneasily in the host states‘ regulatory paradigm, premised on the 
existence of an ascertainable boundary between public and private capital.
98
  The poor fit had 
two explanations:  first, state and private ways of doing transnational business were generally 
converging and getting harder to tell apart;
99
 and second, many SWF sponsors had very different 
ideas about the state‘s role in the economy from those of their hosts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
already in place for foreign, foreign government and controlling investments); Efraim CHALAMISH, Rethinking 
Global Investment Regulation in the Sovereign Wealth Funds Era (9 Sep. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://www.asil.org/files/chalamish.pdf (arguing for the use of bilateral investment treaties against barriers to 
SWF investments). [NOTE TO EDITORS:  May be best to cite to the article in this volume.] 
96
 See Daniella MARKHEIM, The Heritage Foundation, Sovereign Wealth Funds and U.S. National Security, 6 May 
2008, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Sovereign-Wealth-Funds-and-US-National-Security (arguing that, 
properly regulated, SWF are not a threat to United States security); Simon JOHNSON, The Rise of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, Finance & Development, Sep. 2007, 56, 57 (raising concerns about protectionism); Rita RAAGAS 
DE RAMOS, Crisis Reshapes Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds, BUSINESS WEEK, 21 Aug. 2009, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2009/gb20090821_639782_page_2.htm (reporting host state 
fears of SWF shareholder activism and the SWF response, including GAPP); John NUGEÉ, Sovereign Wealth 
Funds' Coming of Age: Unrivaled Titans to Uncertain Mortals, State Street Vision Paper, September 2009, 
available at http://www.statestreet.com/vision/downloads/Vision_SovereignWealth_2009_IV-1.pdf (discussing 
SWF losses due to the financial crisis, and the domestic criticism). 
97
 Concessions by SWFs to increase transparency of their performance drew criticism at home when their 
investments turned sour. See Ian FRASER, Sovereign Funds Chastened, QFINANCE, 29 Sept. 2009, 
http://www.qfinance.com/blogs/ian-fraser/2009/09/29/sovereign-funds-chastened (tracking how signing GAPP can 
backfire when SWFs report losses from the financial crisis); See also NUGEÉ, supra note 98, at 5 (highlighting the 
"vehement criticisms" SWFs face in their home countries). 
98
 See BACKER, Private Law of Public Law, supra note 10, at 13 (arguing that corporate and government actions 
are treated differently by host states, even when they are functionally identical). 
99
 See id. at 4 (positing that states act increasingly within, rather than on, markets). 
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Political scientists were early to highlight the first explanation, framing the rise of SWFs as a 
step in the erosion of the boundary between states and markets.
100
  The erosion accelerated with 
the financial crisis, as governments in the United States and Europe extended public safety nets 
to more and more parts of their economies, including cross-border financial conglomerates.
101
  
This in turn moved SWFs closer to the heart of the policy controversy in major financial centers. 
 
The second explanation evokes Cold War and post-colonial history:  in this view, SWFs and the 
debate about them reflected the latest round of culture clashes in global economic integration; 
however, thanks to capital flow reversals, the process no longer looked like an exercise to 
                                                 
100
 See Giselle DATZ, Governments as Market Players:  New Forms of State Competition, Adaptation and 
Innovation in the Global Economy, 62 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 62, 35-49 (2008); Eric HELLEINER 
& Troy LUNDBLAD, States Markets and Sovereign Wealth Funds, GERMAN POLICY STUDIES (Fall 2008); 
Memorandum from Philip G. CERNY, Rutgers University—Newark, to International Political Studies Association 
Annual Convention (26-29 Mar. 2008), available 
at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/1/7/3/pages251735/p251735-1.php.  These 
articles continue a long-running debate about financial globalization and the evolution of the state in political 
science.  See e.g., Philip G. CERNY, Power, Markets and Authority: The Development of Multi-Level Governance 
in International Finance, in Governing Financial Globalization (Andrew BAKER, Alan HUDSON and Richard 
WOODWARD, eds., 2005).  Larry Catá BACKER was among the first law scholars to deploy this argument in the 
SWF context.  BACKER, Private Law of Public Law, supra note 10; see also Larry Catá BACKER, Economic 
Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 1739 (2007) [hereinafter BACKER, Economic Globalization].  Early political science 
treatments of SWFs that place more emphasis on national security include Benjamin J. COHEN, Sovereign Wealth 
Funds and National Security: The Great Tradeoff (2008), available at www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/cohen, and 
Daniel W. DREZNER, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the (in)Security of Global Finance, 62 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 115 (2008). 
101
 See William K. SJOSTROM JR., The AIG Bailout, 66 Washington & Lee Law Review 943 (2009); Mark J. ROE 
& David A. SKEEL JR., Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 Michigan Law Review 727 (2010); Adam SMITH, 
Britain Sets Details of Huge Bank-Bailout Plan, Time, 13 Oct. 2008, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1849612,00.html; Parmy OLSEN, French Bailout Boosts Europe, 
Forbes.com, 21 Oct. 2008, available at http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/21/briefing-europe-morning-markets-
equity-cx_po_1021markets06.html; The Bottomless Pit, Spiegel Online, 23 Dec. 2008, available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,598207,00.html. 
As part of its crisis response, the United States took a 36% ownership stake in Citigroup.  Citi also attracted 
―private‖ capital from GIC. CitiGroup, Inc., Offer to Exchange (Amend. 5 to Form S-4), at 70 (2009 July 17), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000119312509150642/ds4a.htm.   Citi‘s newly public 
ownership ran afoul of the laws in foreign jurisdictions where it had bank subsidiaries.  For a time, the markets 
fretted that Citi would be forced to sell Banamex, a profitable bank and Mexico‘s second largest.  A flurry of 
diplomatic efforts brought promises of emergency legislation in Mexico and elsewhere. 
See Mexico Treasury Seeks Measure Favoring Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (20 Mar. 2009, 7:23 AM), 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/mexico-treasury-seeks-measure-favoring-citigroup/.  It is tempting to 
see this incident as a turning of the tables on U.S. protectionists, and there is a sense in which it is.  But it may make 
more sense to see this and other developments since 2005, including the financial crisis, as part of the evolution of a 
global financial system where pure forms are increasingly scarce, and everyone is a hybrid. 
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reshape the world in the Anglo-American image.
102
  In 2005, state commerce—and with it the 
debates about state role in the marketplace—looked quite different from the way they looked 
fifty years earlier. 
 
In 1952, the top lawyer at the U.S. State Department informed his counterpart at the Justice 
Department that the United States would no longer support sovereign claims of absolute 
immunity in U.S. court cases involving commercial activity by another state.  The law was 
keeping pace with the international economy: 
 
[L]ittle support has been found except on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites for 
continued full acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity . . . . [T]he 
department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments 
engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons 
doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.
 103
 
 
The United States sought to make its firms more competitive against growing state commerce 
from the Soviet bloc; old doctrine was putting private firms at a disadvantage to state firms, 
which could not be sued.  Under new doctrine, operating ―not as a regulator of a market, but in 
the manner of a private player within it‖104 exposed trading firms from state socialist economies 
to lawsuits in U.S. federal courts.   
 
This commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity, now well-established in U.S. and 
international law, is an example of legal doctrine that was from the start a way of mediating U.S. 
interaction with countries that held different views of the state‘s role in the economy.  But 
because the dominant mode of economic interaction between the United States and the Soviet 
Union in 1952 was trade, the way the Soviets organized their internal affairs was unimportant—
                                                 
102
 Yvonne C L LEE, A Reversal of Neo-Colonialism: The Pitfalls and Prospects of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 40 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1103, 1116 (2009) (suggesting that concern over SWFs 
prompted hosts to deploy arguments previously used against Western colonialism). 
103
 Letter from Jack B. TATE, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. 
PERLMAN (19 May 1952), reprinted in 26 DEPARTMENT STATE BULL 984, 984–85 (1952). 
104
 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).  However, an activity that may be private for 
foreign sovereign immunity purposes may be public in other areas of the law: Argentina‘s market borrowing is 
patently commercial; Kentucky‘s is ―quintessentially public‖.  Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 128 S. 
Ct. 1801, 1810 (2008).  Identity matters. 
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the exception to sovereign immunity would help level the playing field for U.S. firms, not 
manage their acquisition by the Soviet state. 
 
Fifty years later, with a new wave of sovereign commerce, hereto irrelevant details of how other 
states run their economies have become critical.  SWFs practice investment, not trade, potentially 
on a vastly larger scale than the state investors that came before.  To the extent they have the 
latent capacity to control their U.S. investment targets,
105
 their hosts care about who controls 
SWFs and how.  To rephrase Justice Scalia,
106
  SWFs can operate both as regulators of the 
market and as private players within it, and can choose and switch between such roles. This in 
turn exposes the funds to potentially contradictory legal and political demands. 
 
Most SWFs are wholly state-owned and controlled, but engage in commercial activity within the 
meaning of relevant U.S. law.
107
  However, in the new mode of sovereign commerce, SWFs raise 
concerns under a broader range of domestic laws.  Thus scholars have questioned whether SWFs 
should be treated as private shareholders under state corporate law when they buy stock in U.S. 
firms,
108
 but also whether they should benefit from tax exemptions for foreign governments.
109
  
And even though the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has dealt with 
sovereign issuers for decades, its chairman expressed doubt about his ability to charge a foreign 
government with insider trading.
110
 
 
                                                 
105
 Although control is usually associated with foreign direct investment, there is no reason in principle why 
sovereign portfolio investors could not acquire effective control of a firm either through large equity stakes or 
informal influence. 
106
 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614; see DATZ supra note 100 for examples. 
107
 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A. 1602. 
108
 Ronald J. GILSON & Curtis J. MILHAUPT, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance:  A Minimalist 
Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1345 (2008).  But see ROSE, supra note 95 
(highlighting existing safeguards). 
109
 Victor FLEISCHER, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 440 (2009) 
(finding that the current exemption is based on traditional state sovereignty and arguing that due to SWFs similarity 
to private investors, they should be treated as such).  But see Ruth MASON, Efficient Management of the Wealth of 
Nations, 20 TAX NOTES 1321, 1322 (2008) (noting favorable aspects of SWF investments). 
110
 Chairman Christopher COX, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Role of Governments in Markets, 
Keynote Address and Robert B. Glauber Lecture at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 
(24 Oct. 2007) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407cc.htm.  See also GREENE & 
YEAGER, supra note 95 (acknowledging enforcement concern and highlighting existing protections). 
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In sum, SWFs are part of a new generation in state commerce where diverse economic, political 
and legal systems come in continuous, intimate contact.  SWFs are public and private at the same 
time; as such, they do not fit into neat legal and regulatory boxes.  Even when they act 
commercially, SWFs are sovereign—profit will drive them, until it does not.111  States may not 
respond to regulatory incentives as private actors do; yet they are often subject to the same laws.  
SWFs have separate information and communication channels to regulators, raising the 
possibility of both insider trading and regulatory capture.  Their decision-making may be 
insulated from politics and markets alike, or exposed to both.  More daunting yet, each state is 
different: Brazil, China, Norway, Qatar and the United States mix public and private in different 
ways.  When their hybrids go global, they expose distinct tensions in the law and structure of 
global finance.
112
 
 
IV. Axes of Accountability 
 
Finding themselves at the center of high-profile policy debates in host states, SWFs had limited 
flexibility to respond.  Their sponsors and their hosts had very different needs and expectations.  
Moreover, diversity among SWFs meant that each fund was potentially subject to a unique set of 
legal and political demands reflecting its provenance, constitution, and investment targets.  This 
would make it hard for SWFs to coordinate among themselves—their objectives and constraints 
differ—and hard for SWF hosts to devise a unified response to something that is not a unified 
phenomenon.  Put differently, a fund from China or Abu Dhabi would have trouble operating in 
a framework designed for Norway, and vice versa.
113
  This part of the Article maps four 
categories of demands on SWFs, and illustrates them with case studies.  The goal is to 
understand to whom they answer, so as to decide to whom they should answer and find ways to 
resolve conflicts among SWFs‘ constituencies.   
 
                                                 
111
 See COHEN & DeLONG, supra note 15, at 66. Backer observes that similar reasoning led the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice to conclude that states are essentially incapable of acting 
commercially.  BACKER, Private Law of Public Law, supra note 10, at 1809-11. 
112
 HELLEINER & LUNDBLAD, supra note 102. 
113
 This observation is distinct from a view on the merits of either framework. 
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SWFs are not unique for juggling conflicting demands.  Any firm operating across national 
boundaries must to some extent answer to home and host state demands.  Similarly, public-
private hybrids like government-sponsored enterprises must reconcile duties to their shareholders 
with duties to the public.
114
  Transnational hybrids such as SWFs
 
face a four-fold challenge:  they 
are accountable to constituencies at home and abroad;
115
  to the public at large, and to a narrower 
set of stakeholders defined by their organizational form and business practices.  With multiple 
sovereigns involved in multiple capacities, there is no obvious hierarchy among such demands 
for accountability.  In place of a hierarchy, an effective framework for governing SWFs must 
enable ongoing negotiation among the four dimensions of accountability. 
 
First, there is public internal accountability, achieved within the political system of the capital-
exporting state.  As government institutions, SWFs must further domestic public purpose.  The 
state may be democratic, in which case SWFs answer to elected officials, or not, in which case 
they might answer to the monarch and her five cousins.  I illustrate this set of demands using 
Russia‘s recent SWF experiments and an old scandal involving Kuwait‘s SWF.  
 
Second, private internal accountability refers to SWFs‘ duties to a subset of shareholders, 
creditors, or other stakeholders, which stem predominantly from their charters and contracts.  
Public and private internal accountability may conflict where, for example, a fund formed to save 
for future generations is raided to advance unrelated strategic goals.
116
  Transparency can expose 
internal accountability tensions.  A transparent SWF set up to maximize financial returns may 
have to forego opportunities in politically unpopular sectors or countries to maintain public 
support.
117
  I illustrate private internal accountability with examples from Singapore and Abu 
Dhabi. 
 
                                                 
114
 See A. Michael FROOMKIN, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW 
REVIEW 543, 562-574 (1995).  The most prominent examples of hybrids in the financial sector are U.S. housing 
finance agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac prior to government takeover in 2008. 
115
 See Ashby H.B. MONK, supra note 38. 
116
 More prosaically, Norway‘s SWF has financed the government beyond the limits established by its internal 
guidelines.  TRUMAN, Blueprint, supra note 29, at 9. 
117
 SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 83. 
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Third, public external accountability implies a duty of state-owned funds to adhere to 
international norms.  Although public international law increasingly seeks to bind private parties 
directly, states remain its principal subjects.  Acting as a market participant does not absolve the 
state of its basic public duties,
118
 for example, not to fund genocide.  I illustrate this dimension 
below on the example of Norway‘s State Pension Fund. 
 
Fourth, private external accountability describes SWFs as subjects of host country laws and 
norms applicable to private market participants.  Compliance with host legal regimes designed 
for private firms can have far-reaching effects on SWF sponsors‘ domestic economic 
management and their investment policies worldwide.  It can also conflict with domestic 
priorities and demands for internal accountability.  I illustrate the dilemma of SWF 
accountability as participants in host country markets on the example of Chinese banks‘ entry in 
New York. 
 
A. Public Internal Accountability:  Russian Experiments and Kuwaiti Scandals 
 
Public internal accountability describes SWFs‘ duties as custodians of public funds to the 
domestic public at large, expressed directly or through formal government structures. Such 
accountability demands surface most often at the time of SWF establishment, or at crisis points, 
when the public finds out either that the fund failed to live up to its mission, or that the mission 
itself was flawed.  In this sense, public internal accountability relies on the availability of 
information that strikes a domestic political nerve.  It benefits from the growth of information 
media, but does not require it.  It has played an important role in the newest and oldest SWFs 
alike.  In this section, Russia‘s repeated attempts to establish a sovereign wealth fund illustrate 
the role of domestic political pressures in SWF policy; a 1993 scandal involving the world‘s 
oldest SWF in Kuwait shows the capacity of SWFs to catalyze public demands for broader 
political liberalization. 
 
                                                 
118
 Cf.  Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (making a similar argument in the U.S. 
domestic context). 
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Russia came late to the SWF scene.  As recently as June 2008, Prime Minister Putin told the 
visiting U.S. Treasury Secretary that Russia had no SWF.  This was true in the sense that the 
state investment vehicles Russia had established beginning in 2004 still held primarily high-
quality foreign government paper, much like official reserves.
119
  On the other hand, Russia‘s 
plans to run a more diversified and aggressive fund on the model of other oil-exporting states 
made it a poster child for host state fears.
120
  Commentators criticized the ―semi-authoritarian‖ 
habits of Russia‘s government and pointed to the history of crude political interventions by its 
SOEs.
121
  
 
Against this background the vigor of Russian domestic political debates about SWF policy, and 
the government response, are instructive.  Not only were SWF policies hotly contested in the 
press, but the government reorganized the funds at least twice in their brief history, apparently in 
response to popular pressure. 
 
Russia had barely recovered from its 1998 financial crisis when it began considering, with IMF 
support, a fiscal stabilization fund financed from excess oil revenues.
122
  After a fund was 
established in 2004, IMF staff and directors argued that Russia should save more oil revenues to 
insure itself against future price declines, control government spending, and temper inflation.
123
  
However, much of the domestic commentary favored a development fund model investing in 
infrastructure and domestic enterprise.
124
  At the outset, Russia formed a basic stabilization fund 
holding safe foreign government debt; some excess oil revenues were also used to meet pension 
                                                 
119
 LAWDER & BRYANSKI, supra note 28. 
120
 See Anders ASLUND, The Truth About Sovereign Wealth Funds, Foreign Policy (3 Dec. 2007) (criticizing 
popular perceptions that ―[t]he Arabs, the Chinese, and the Russians are about to buy up large swathes of Western 
economies,‖ but claiming that SWFs are typically established by ―semi-authoritarian‖ governments in ―semi-
developed‖ countries essentially to fleece their own citizens).  
121
 Id.; ASLUND, supra note 8. 
122
 Staff Report, Russian Federation:  2003 Article IV Consultation, International Monetary Fund, IMF Country 
Report No. 03/144, 15-16 (10 Apr. 2003) available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03144.pdf. 
Similar ideas surfaced earlier in vague form, see Staff Report, Russian Federation:  2001 Article IV Consultation 
and Post-Program Monitoring Discussions, International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 02/74, 11 (15 
Feb. 2002) available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2002/cr0274.pdf. 
123
 Public Information Notice, Russian Federation: 2004 Article IV Consultation, International Monetary Fund, IMF 
Country Report No. 04/112 (30 Sept. 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Article IV Report PIN] available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04314.pdf. 
124
 POPOVA, supra note 38.  
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obligations and pay down Russia‘s own debt.125  But a year later, Russia broke off roughly $9 
billion from the stabilization fund to form a domestic infrastructure and growth fund.  In early 
2008, the government further divided up the remaining stabilization fund into a $125 billion 
Reserve Fund, which continued the original mission, and a $32 billion Fund for National Well-
Being, whose mission was actively contested.
126
  The smaller fund was ultimately given a public 
pension mandate.
127
  All three funds were on-budget and reported to the finance ministry.  In all, 
the authorities responded to domestic pressure by ―splitting the baby‖ among their public 
constituents. 
 
By the time the financial crisis hit Russia in 2008, the $9 billion infrastructure fund had invested 
less than one per cent of its allocation; it was ultimately raided to cover budget deficits.
128
  While 
the Reserve Fund was also drawn down to cover the deficits, this was consistent with its fiscal 
stabilization mandate.  At this writing, the Reserve Fund stands at less than a third of its pre-
crisis levels.
129
  In contrast, the Fund for National Well-Being has grown almost threefold, to 
about $90 billion since 2008.
130
  However, its path to growth was unorthodox:  during the crisis, 
the fund was used to defend the ruble, invest in the Russian stock market, and support Russian 
banks and ―strategic‖ domestic firms; it also funded construction loans for the Olympic 
village.
131
  In other words, the pension-savings fund became a rescue-stimulus fund.  
 
                                                 
125
 2004 Article IV Report PIN, supra note 123. 
126
 See e.g., POPOVA, supra note 38. 
127
 Id.; Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, Минфин России: Фонд национального благосостояния: 
Предназначение [Fund for National Well-Being:  Mission] at 
http://www1.minfin.ru/ru/nationalwealthfund/mission/ (last visited 31 May 2010) (defining the fund‘s mission as 
financing the public contribution to private pension savings, and covering deficits in the public pension fund). 
128
 POPOVA, supra note 38, at 11 (examining a case study of Russia in a discussion of sovereign wealth funds). 
129
 Rachel Ziemba reports a decline from $157 billion in December 2007 to $76 billion in September 2009, based on 
official figures; however, the 2007 baseline includes the $32 billion that became the Fund for National Well-Being.  
Rachel ZIEMBA, supra note 37.  The latest Russian Finance Ministry figures available at this writing have the 
Reserve Fund at just over $40 billion; less than one-third of $125 billion value at the time of its 2008 split with the 
well-being fund. See Russian Ministry of Finance, Table, Совокупный объем средств Резервного фонда 
[Aggregate Reserve Fund Volume], 2010, 
http://www1.minfin.ru/ru/reservefund/statistics/volume/index.php?id4=5796. 
130
 See Russian Ministry of Finance, Table, Совокупный объем средств Фонда национального благосостояния 
[The Cumulative Amount of the National Welfare Fund], 2010, 
http://www1.minfin.ru/ru/nationalwealthfund/statistics/volume/index.php?id4=6412. 
131
 POPOVA, supra note 38, at 13-14. 
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Russia‘s experience illustrates three aspects of SWF accountability that have relevance beyond 
Russia.  First, old Western democracies do not have a monopoly on public internal 
accountability.  Illiberal governments
132
 may alter their SWF investment strategy in response to 
formal and informal public pressure.  Second, where public internal accountability comes in 
conflict with private internal accountability—for example, where crisis response imperatives 
conflict with the funds‘ charter mission (here, pension funding)—public accountability can exert 
a stronger pull.  Put differently, domestic legal constraints do not always bind the sovereign.
133
  
Third and related, sovereigns do and must have the capacity to change their minds.  Thus 
statements that ―there is nothing in [Russian SWF] structure or goals to suggest that it could or 
would be used as a weapon‖ against other states,134 surely overreach.  At a minimum, accounts 
that privilege public internal accountability suggest that SWFs should be used as weapons if the 
domestic public so wishes.  Whether the public does is a separate matter.
135
 
 
On the other hand, public outrage about SWF mismanagement can also channel demands for 
broader domestic liberalization, altering formal political accountability structures in SWF home 
countries.  A 1993 scandal involving Kuwait‘s SWF investments in Europe appears to have 
played such a liberalizing role
136
 long before SWFs were named, and before the latest round of 
democratic demands directed at Arab SWFs.
137
   
 
                                                 
132
 Fareed ZAKARIA, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec. 1997) 
133
 See TRUMAN, Blueprint, supra note 29, at 9 (suggesting that making SWF structure too rigid is unrealistic and 
that SWF domestic legislation should specify a process for adapting the structure over time). 
134
 Arina POPOVA, We Don't Want to Conquer You, We Have Enough to Worry About:  The Russian Sovereign 
Wealth Fund, 118 YALE LAW JOURNAL POCKET PART 109 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/2008/11/24/popova.html. 
135
 A final irony emerged in recent intimations by former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson that Russia 
sought to drive a sell-off in U.S. housing agency securities in retaliation for the United States‘ opposition to Russia‘s 
war in Georgia.  Michael McKEE  & Alex NICHOLSON, Paulson Says Russia Urged China to Dump Fannie, 
Freddie Bonds, BLOOMBERG (29 Jan. 2010), available at  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=afbSjYv3v814.  Barely six month earlier, Russia‘s 
finance ministry had announced that the Reserve Fund and the national well-being fund were cleared to invest in 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Denis MATERNOVSKY & Alex NICHOLSON, Russian Sovereign Funds Can Buy 
Freddie Mac Bonds, BLOOMBERG (21 Feb. 2008), available at  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=agRQcQeLeK3k&refer=home.  
136
 See e.g., Kim MURPHY, $5-Billion Loss Riles Even Oil-Rich Kuwaitis; Scandal: Parliament‟s Probe of Public 
Funds Poses the Most Serious Challenge Ever to the Ruling Family‟s Power, Los Angeles Times (10 Feb. 1993); 
Mark FINEMAN, Rough-and-Tumble Democracy Has Kuwait Edgy, Los Angeles Times (10 Apr. 1993); Caryle 
MURPHY, Kuwaiti Scandal May Strengthen Parliament‟s Role, Washington Post (1 Mar. 1993); Ali SALEM, 
Kuwaiti MPs Override Objections to Launch KIO Probe, Arab Times (2 Dec. 1992) reprinted in Moneyclips GCC 
Ltd. (2 Dec. 1992)[online].  Available: LexisNexis. 
137
 BEHRENDT & KODMANI, Eds., supra note 32. 
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The entity now known as the Kuwait Investment Office in London (KIO) was established in 
1953, and is widely recognized as the world‘s oldest SWF.  Like its parent Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA), established in 1982, KIO is an asset manager for the finance ministry; it does 
not own the assets.
138
  KIA manages the government‘s General Reserve Fund and the Fund for 
Future Generations (FFG), which has a classic SWF mandate of turning underground wealth into 
financial assets for intergenerational transfer.  FFG receives 10% of Kuwait‘s annual oil 
revenues.  The 1982 law that established KIA prohibits ―disclosure to the public of any 
information related to KIA‘s work,‖ including the value of its assets under management, 
privately estimated at just over $200 billion.
139
  Instead, the law mandates reporting to the 
Council of Ministers.
140
  What limited public awareness there had been of KIA‘s and KIO‘s 
management of FFG diminished after Kuwait‘s parliament was disbanded in 1986.  When Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in 1990, ―KIO‘s holdings became the national treasury-in-exile.‖141  By the 
war‘s end, at least half of the $85-100 billion estimated pre-war asset value had gone.142 
 
Although much of the money was used for war and reconstruction expenses, when the National 
Assembly reconvened in mid-1992, it discovered that some of the funds had simply vanished 
without a trace, others were used to buy bad debts reportedly owed to local banks by well-
connected Kuwaitis, yet others were simply mismanaged.
143
  KIO‘s Spanish portfolio, estimated 
at $5 billion, had been lost completely to a combination of dubious investments in Spain‘s 
                                                 
138Bader M. AL SA‘AD, Managing Dir. of Kuwait Inv. Auth., Overview on the Kuwait Investment Authority and 
Issues Related to Sovereign Wealth Funds, Keynote Speech at the First Luxembourg Foreign Trade Conference (9 
Apr. 2008), available at 
http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Overview_of_KIA/Documents/FINA_SPCH_LUXEMBORG_APR_9_092.
pdf. 
139
 Transparency and Disclosure of Information, KUWAIT INVESTMENT AUTHORITY, 
http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Tansparency/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 16 June 2010) (describing 
disclosure prohibitions) [hereinafter KIA Transparency]; TRUMAN, THREAT OR SALVATION, supra note 19, at 
Table 1.1. 
140
 KIA Transparency, supra note 136. 
141
 Kim MURPHY, supra note 136. 
142
 Caryle MURPHY, supra note 136 (estimating half of the pre-war value lost); see also Kuwait:  Into a Black 
Hole, THE ECONOMIST, 30 Jan. 1993 (estimating $30 billion remaining of $100 billion pre-war value); Youssef M. 
IBRAHIM, Financial Shakedown is Shaking Kuwait, N.Y. Times, 10 Jan. 1993, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/10/world/financial-scandal-is-shaking-kuwait.html?pagewanted=1 (estimating a 
loss of 60 to 80 per cent from $100 billion). 
143
 Caryle MURPHY, supra note 136; Kim MURPHY, supra note 139; IBRAHIM, supra note 145. 
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declining economy and suspicious fees.
144
  Perhaps coincidentally, KIO‘s first big Spanish 
investment of $900 million came the year parliament had been disbanded; KIO‘s new 
management was installed after losses were uncovered in 1992.
145
 
 
The incident became a focal point for debates in the new parliament and catalyzed the passage of 
a new law requiring KIA to report to the parliament twice a year on ―all major state 
investments;‖ it also unleashed furious criticisms in the press framed squarely in terms of public 
oversight and accountability.
146
  The authorities banned local press coverage of the incident in 
January of 1993; however, fears that the parliament would be disbanded again did not 
materialize.
147
  To be sure, those implicated in the Spanish scandal described their predicament, 
and the lawsuits against them in the United Kingdom, as a post-war political witch hunt.
148
  And 
even though English judges ruled in Kuwait‘s favor,149 the full story behind the scandals remains 
murky.  It is certain, however, that domestic public demands for SWF accountability had a 
political impact far beyond the fund itself, and reverberated in host states and international 
markets.   
 
B. Private Internal Accountability: Form Sharing in Singapore and Abu Dhabi 
 
Private internal accountability captures SWFs‘ duties to a particular group of constituents, rather 
than the domestic public in general; it can also describe SWF constraints under a specialized 
mandate.  The simplest example is a pension fund managing particular citizens‘ retirement 
savings.  Such a fund might be tightly integrated in state finances and used to supplement budget 
revenues; even so, it likely owes a distinct set of duties to a designated subset of beneficiaries.  
                                                 
144
 Roger COHEN, Missing Millions—Kuwait‟s Bad Bet—A Special Report:  Big Wallets and Little Supervision, 
The New York Times (28 Sep. 1993).  
145
 Id. 
146
 E.g., Kim MURPHY, supra note 136 (quoting the chairman of the parliamentary Finance Committee seeking to 
find out ―who really controls the KIO‖:  ―‘In general, this office is not controlled by the national audit office.  It is 
not even controlled directly by the minister of finance.  … Who controls it? … We don‘t know.‖); Caryle 
MURPHY, supra note 136 (quoting the chairman of the parliamentary Legal Committee:  ―‘I would consider this a 
historic year for Kuwait concerning the control of the assembly over Kuwait‘s investments. … No one could dream 
to do this before the invasion.‘‖) 
147
 Kim MURPHY, supra note 139. 
148
 Ahmed AL JARALLAH, KIO Investments Lost in Politics, Arab Times (20 Sep. 1993). 
149
 B.A. TAYLOR, Grupo Torras SA & Anor v. Royal Bank of Scotland International & Others, 7 TRUSTS & 
TRUSTEES, 2001 at 25-26. 
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The discussion of Russia‘s SWFs in the previous section points to another element of private 
internal accountability: the legal form in which a fund is organized, its mission and its 
contracting practices may create demands on SWFs that complement or conflict with broader 
public needs.  Examples from Singapore and Abu Dhabi further illustrate the significance of 
such factors. 
 
Singapore and Abu Dhabi both use two distinct types of SWFs:  a stabilization/savings fund 
invested exclusively in foreign assets, and a development fund specializing in strategic 
investments at home and abroad.
150
  The stabilization/savings funds—the Government of 
Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA)—are 
financed from budget surpluses and foreign exchange reserves; they do not borrow in the 
markets.  Like KIA, described in the previous section, GIC and ADIA manage, but do not own 
the assets attributed to them.  The SWF entity is organized as a management company for public 
funds.
151
  In contrast, the development funds—Temasek Holdings in Singapore and Mubadala 
Development Company in Abu Dhabi—own the assets they manage; unusually for SWFs, they 
also engage in limited market borrowing.
152
  The use of multiple organizational forms by each 
government, and the similarities between SWF forms across very different economies and legal 
systems, help explain the funds‘ respective disclosure and accountability practices. 
 
Cross-country parallels are especially revealing in view of the many differences among the four 
funds.  ADIA, estimated at over $600 billion, is one of the world‘s largest SWFs; it is about 
thirty times the size of Mubadala, valued at just over $20 billion.
153
 ADIA is also almost thirty 
years older, formed as a stand-alone legal entity in 1976 to manage the government‘s oil 
surpluses;
154
 its current mandate is to invest government funds ―to secure and maintain the future 
                                                 
150
 The government also uses other state investment vehicles, which are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., 
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INVESTMENT COMPANY, http://www.ipic.ae/en/home/index.aspx (last visited 17 June 
2010). 
151
 GIC, Corporate Governance Homepage, http://www.gic.com.sg/aboutus_check.htm (last visited 17 June 2010). 
152
 Mubadala Annual Report 2009, MUBADALA, http://www.mubadala.ae/2010_annualreport/ (last visited 15 June 
2010); Temasek Review 2009, TEMASEK, http://review.temasek.com.sg/introduction/year-in-review (last visited 15 
June 2010). 
153
 TRUMAN, THREAT OR SALVATION, supra note 19, at Table 1.1; see also SETSER & ZIEMBA, Reversal, supra 
note 37, at 21-22 (lower estimates for ADIA at the height of the financial crisis). 
154
 Middle East Online, Abu Dhabi Wealth Fund Unveils First-ever Strategy, 15 Mar. 2010 http://www.middle-east-
online.com/english/business/?id=37836 (last visited June 26, 2010); CIA World Factbook, Oil: Proved Reserves 
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welfare of the Emirate.‖155  Its stated policy is to keep its equity stakes in target firms under 5%, 
and to refrain from voting its shares.  Mubadala, formed in 2002, is a product of the most recent 
round of commodity price spikes.
156
  It is charged with helping diversify the Emirate‘s economy 
by making long-term, capital-intensive investments focusing on Abu Dhabi, UAE and the 
surrounding region; its mission is somewhat more specific than ADIA‘s and includes delivering 
both a ―strong financial return‖ and a ―tangible social impact.‖157  Almost two-thirds of its 
investments are domestic; it takes significant equity stakes and does not shy away from voting 
them.
158
 
 
GIC‘s estimated $250 billion in assets are roughly double Temasek‘s.159  It was founded in 1981 
as a reserve management vehicle for the government and the Monetary Authority of Singapore; 
its current mission is broadly consistent with its origins: ―to achieve good long-term returns‖ on 
state assets ―to preserve and enhance the international purchasing power of Singapore‘s 
reserves.‖160  In contrast, Temasek started as a domestic SOE holding company in 1974; its early 
history and initial mandate are linked with post-independence development of Singapore, not 
reserve management.
161
  Neither Mubadala nor Temasek consider themselves to be SWFs, 
although they fit the Santiago Principles definition, and outside analysts routinely classify them 
as SWFs.
162
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2010) available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html (ranking 
the UAE seventh in proven oil reserves, of which Abu Dhabi owns 94%). 
155
 ADIA ANNUAL REVIEW 2 (2009) available at http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/Annual_Review_Website2.pdf. 
156
 See note 152 supra. 
157
 Mubadala, http://www.mubadala.ae/ (last visited June 13, 2010). 
158
 See About Mubadala http://www.mubadala.ae/en/category/about-mubadala/ (last visited 13 June 2010) 
(describing Mubadala investments); see also Robin WIGGLESWORTH, Higher Revenue and Fair Value Boost 
Mubadala, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2010) available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/101d0886-358d-11df-963f-
00144feabdc0.html (examples of Mubadala‘s investment strategies). 
159
 TRUMAN, THREAT OR SALVATION, supra note 19, at Table 1.1. 
160
 GIC, About Us, http://www.gic.com.sg/aboutus_profile_mission.htm (last visited 13 June 2010); GIC, About Us 
Milestones, http://www.gic.com.sg/aboutus_story_milestone1.htm(last visited 13 June 2010). 
161
 Temasek at 35,  http://review.temasek.com.sg/overview/temasek-35 (last visited 13 June 2010). 
162
 SWF Institute, Mubadala, available at http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/mubadala/ (last visited 30 June 2010) 
(―Mubadala does not consider itself a Sovereign Wealth Fund.‖); Temasek Says it is Not a Sovereign Wealth Fund, 
THE STRAITS TIMES (22 Mar. 2008) available at http://www.straitstimes.com/Free/Story/STIStory_219340.html.  
This position may reveal a desire on the part of the smaller development funds to distance themselves from the 
image of SWFs as passive reserve management vehicles, to stress their commercial character and independence 
from the government. Nevertheless, Temasek participates in the newly established SWF forum; Mubadala does not. 
INTERNATIONAL FORUM OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, http://www.ifswf.org/ (last visited 20 June 2010).  Edwin 
M. TRUMAN, A Scoreboard for Sovereign Wealth Funds, Table 1:  Sovereign Wealth Funds at 10, available at 
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All four funds provided very little public disclosure until recently.  ADIA was particularly stark 
in revealing only its address and switchboard number before 2010.  This opacity did not seem to 
pose a problem before SWF controversy erupted in mid-2000s: all but the newly formed 
Mubadala were well-known among international financial market participants;
163
 at home, they 
generally reported to their government authorities behind closed doors.  In response to host 
country hostility, the funds all ramped up public information flow in recent years; all four have 
also sought to emphasize their commercial character, substantial autonomy from their respective 
governments in selecting investments, and corporate social responsibility.
164
  Temasek was the 
first of the group to release an annual report in 2004, including the total size of its holdings, 
earnings and portfolio information.
165
  It has since published externally audited financial 
statements.  GIC has released two annual reports since 2008, outlining its governance and 
investment objectives, though not its size or the details of its portfolio.  Mubadala has published 
annual reports since 2008, and externally audited financial statements since 2009.
166
  ADIA 
came last; its first ―Annual Review‖ came out in March 2010, broadly addressing the firm‘s 
mission and structure, but not its total size or investment details.
 167
 
 
The differences between Temasek‘s and Mubadala‘s relatively fulsome disclosure and the more 
measured revelations of their bigger siblings faced with the same foreign controversy illustrate 
the distinct private internal accountability demands on the funds.  First, Temasek and Mubadala 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/truman1007swf.pdf (listing both Mubadala and Temasek among its ranked 
SWFs). 
163
 Mohamed A. EL-ERIAN, Sovereign Wealth Funds in the New Normal, 47 FIN. &  DEV. 44 (2010). 
164
 See Mubadala Corporate Responsibility Homepage, http://www.mubadala.ae/en/category/corporate-social-
responsibility/ (last visited June 17, 2010) (committing to support education and cultural projects); Temasek 
Holdings Community Care Homepage, http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/about_us_2.htm (last visited (June 17, 
2010) (earmarking earnings for community projects); ADIA Governance, 
http://www.adia.ae/En/Governance/Abudhabi_Government.aspx (last visited 17 June 2010) (highlighting 
independence from Abu Dhabi government with respect to investment decisions); GIC, supra note 154 (stressing 
limited government control over investment decisions). 
165
 Temasek Holdings, Temasek Review 2004, available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050311223354/http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/2004review/AR_Secured.pdf; see 
Saeed AZHAR, Temasek Review to Bring Leadership in Focus, Reuters, Sept. 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE58F02520090916. 
166
 MUBADALA, Investor Relations, http://www.mubadala.ae/en/category/investor-relations-12/ (last visited 15 June 
2010). 
167
 Robin WIGGLESWORTH, Andrew ENGLAND & Simeon KERR, Sovereign Wealth Funds Open Up Books, 
Financial Times (17 Mar. 2010). 
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both issue debt securities in the international markets, where investors expect (and many 
regulators require) standardized financial reporting and narrative disclosure.
168
  Second, their 
investment mandates, which contemplate larger stakes held for longer and managed more 
actively, make it more difficult to keep investments quiet.  Third, if the funds abide by their long-
term development objectives, this may reduce the immediate macroeconomic policy sensitivity 
of their disclosure:  for example, they are less likely to be used for foreign exchange intervention.  
On the other hand, their capacity to take bigger stakes in target firms may have a bigger effect in 
the market. 
 
Inasmuch as Temasek and Mubadala owe duties to their private creditors along with their state 
shareholders, they commit to accountability practices that may exert continuing discipline
169
 and 
engender path dependence.  Financial reports and credit ratings
170
 will be compared over time, 
along with their investment track record at home and in different parts of the world.  Such private 
accountability in turn has public implications.  Private analysts—and with them, the media—will 
note and publicize disclosure cutbacks and discrepancies.  Similarly, the more narrowly specified 
the fund‘s mandate and holdings, the more noticeable the deviations, even where these may serve 
the public interest broadly.  Finally, the smaller funds‘ mandate of domestic and foreign asset 
holdings may prompt domestic and foreign audiences alike to pay attention.  
 
Private internal accountability is best visible with, but not limited to, identifiable private 
constituents (creditors, pensioners) or a narrowly specified investment mandate.  There is a gray 
area between public and private internal accountability, which GIC and ADIA governance 
                                                 
168
 Both issuers have taken advantage of exemptions from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
registration requirements under the Securities Act of 1933.  MUBADALA, supra note 155; TEMASEK, supra note 155.  
They remain subject to antifraud rules under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Thomas Lee HAZEN, Treatise on 
the Law of Securities Regulation Vol. 2, 30 (West 2009); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 10(b) 
(2010); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
169
 Rawi ABDELAL, Sovereign Wealth in Abu Dhabi, Geopolitics 14:317-327 (2009) at 322-23 (describing 
Mubadala‘s debt financing as a disciplining device).   
170
 Mubadala received an Aa3 rating from Moody's and AA from Fitch. Fitch, FitchRatings: Mubadala Development 
Company, http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/ratings/issr_rtng.cfm?issr_id=88043855 (last visited 13 June 
2010); Moody's, At-A-Glance: Mubadala Development Company, 
http://v3.moodys.com/page/ataglance.aspx?orgid=821073204 (last visited 13 June 2010). Temasek received a AAA 
rating from both Standard and Poor's and Moody's. Standard & Poor's, Temasek Holdings Ratings, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/ratings/entity-ratings/en/us/?entityID=277686&sectorCode=CORP (last 
visited 13 June 2010);  Moody's, At-A-Glance: Temasek Holdings Limited, 
http://v3.moodys.com/page/ataglance.aspx?orgid=806791556 (last visited 13 June 2010). 
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structures illustrate.  The KIA scandal discussed earlier offers an additional example.  SWFs 
organized as government asset managers may operate under fairly specific policy guidance, and 
have clear reporting channels within their respective governments.
171
  To the extent specific parts 
of the government own the funds, and the SWFs formally answer to officials in such parts, do 
SWFs managers have independent duties to ascertain and advance the public interest?  For 
example, the finance ministry ―client‖ may be inept or corrupt in directing the SWF; fund 
managers may be bound to follow the directions as a matter of private accountability, but may 
come under pressure to disobey as a matter of public accountability. 
 
The two examples of disclosure and bad direction suggest that private internal accountability 
may enhance or conflict with public internal accountability.  Similarly, both forms of internal 
accountability may enhance or conflict with external accountability demands, which I elaborate 
in the remainder of this Part.  
 
C. Public External Accountability:  Norwegian Ethics 
  
Much of the early host country criticism of SWFs amounted to this—why couldn‘t all SWFs be 
like Norway‘s?172  Norway‘s Government Pension Fund—Global (―GPFG‖) began operations in 
the mid-1990s.  At this writing, GPFG‘s market value is estimated at about $430 billion, of 
which almost two-thirds is in equities.
173
 A real-time value tracker is prominently displayed on 
the website of the fund‘s investment manager, a division at the Norwegian central bank, as if to 
                                                 
171
 See ADIA Annual Review, supra note 158; ADIA Governance Homepage, 
http://www.adia.ae/En/Governance/Governance.aspx (last visited 13 June 2010) (stating that while the funds belong 
to Abu Dhabi, the government only appoints the board of directors of the fund); GIC Report, 25 (2009) available at 
http://www.gic.com.sg/PDF/GIC_Report_2009.pdf (stating that the government of Singapore requires monthly and 
quarterly reports to the Accountant-General); GIC Governance Homepage, 
http://www.gic.com.sg/aboutus_check.htm (last visited 13 June 2010) (revealing a structure similar to the ADIA, but 
with direct reporting to the President of Singapore). 
172
 See Andrew LEONARD, How Wall Street Broke the Free Market, SALON, 15 Jan. 2008, available at 
http://www.salon.com/technology/how_the_world_works/2008/01/15/sovereign_wealth_funds/index.html 
(reporting on a Senate panel in which participants criticized the lack of transparency and standards in most SWFs at 
the time); Implications of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments for National Security: Hearing Before the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 110th Cong. 11 (2 Aug. 2007) (statement of Congresswoman Marcy 
KAPTUR, holding up Norway as the standard for transparency).  But see id. at 114 (statement of Senator Jim 
WEBB highlighting the political fallout from Norway‘s short sales of Icelandic bonds to illustrate the downside 
risks of SWF investments).   
173
 Norges Bank Investment Management, http://www.nbim.no/en/Investments/Market-Value/ (last visited 1 June 
2010). 
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highlight the contrast with Middle Eastern oil exporters, where such disclosure is legally 
barred.
174
  GPFG was authorized by the Norwegian parliament in 1990, and operates as a finance 
ministry account at the central bank, holding budget surpluses from oil revenues with the twin 
goal of macroeconomic stabilization and saving for future generations.  Unlike Norway‘s 
domestic pension fund, GPFG only invests abroad.  The fund is subject to independent audits 
and periodic reports to the legislature, and is required to make public disclosure of its size and 
investment strategy.
175
  The combination of GPFG‘s lack of separate legal personality, its policy 
mandate and transparency make it an interesting case study of the relationship between public 
internal and public external accountability.
176
 
 
GPFG responds to public external accountability demands in two ways.  First, its transparency 
practices—including comprehensive disclosure in English, and disclosure of factors such as the 
use of leverage and derivatives
177—reflect Norway‘s frequently voiced commitment to global 
financial stability, a public good, and its openness to public oversight.
178
  Second, the fund‘s 
investments reflect the recommendations of an independent advisory body, formed to advance 
compliance with Norway‘s obligations under international law and internationally accepted 
ethical norms.  The advisory body—initially, the Advisory Commission on International Law for 
the Fund, since replaced by the Council on Ethics—makes non-binding recommendations to the 
finance ministry, which instructs the central bank to exclude particular investment targets as 
appropriate.
179
  The substantive screening methodology is in addition to the central bank‘s 
mandate to exercise strong corporate governance in connection with fund investments, so as to 
                                                 
174
 KIA Transparency, supra note 139; see also UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT, 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATA ON SIZES AND INVESTMENTS FOR SOME FUNDS ARE 
LIMITED, No. GAO-08-946, 13-14, (September 2008) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08946.pdf  
(citing Kuwait as an example of such a formal prohibition, in contrast to Norway);  see also ABU DHABI 
INVESTMENT AUTHORITY, ADIA REVIEW 2009 (15 Mar. 2010) available at 
http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/Annual_Review_Website2.pdf (failing to disclose value of funds under management). 
175
 For a good overview of GPFG‘s legal form and operation, see BACKER, Regulatory Chameleons, supra note 10, 
at 135-158.  The fund was rebranded and reorganized several times since its establishment. 
176
 Separate legal personality adds a heavier overlay of private internal accountability. 
177
 Norges Bank Investment Management, Report, GIPS Mandated Performance Results, 3-4 (28 May 2010) 
available at http://www.nbim.no/Global/Documents/News/2010/Updated_GIPS%20Report_Final_20100528.pdf. 
178
 See Norges Bank Investment Management, http://www.nbim.no/en/About-us/faq/ (last visited 1 June 2010) 
(describing long term stability and safe financial growth for future generations as the fund's goal). 
179
 See Norway Ministry of Finance, Council on Ethics Webpage, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-
topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsible-investments/the-council-on-ethics-for-the-
government.html?id=447010 (last visited June 1, 2010); CHESTERMAN, supra note 12 for an in-depth analysis.  
Draft July 19, 2010 
Forthcoming in Asian Journal of International Law 
 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1639119 
 
38 
maximize sustainable returns for future generations.
180
 This set of institutional mechanisms 
geared to good global citizenship also establishes a process by which the fund‘s ultimate owners 
(―the people of Norway, represented by the political authorities‖)181 ascertain the SWF‘s 
domestic legitimacy.
182
 
 
The content of GPFG‘s external accountability is revealing.  In the beginning, the focus was on 
securing compliance with Norway‘s formal treaty commitments.183  However, as the framework 
evolved, the fund served as a means of elaborating a broader and more complex ethical regime 
that included non-binding norms such as the U.N. Global Compact, which advance ―public 
accountability‖ for private transnational firms,184 labor and environmental standards, as well as 
anti-corruption norms, which had widely different legal origins and status under national and 
international law.
185
  In its first two years of existence, the Council on Ethics recommended and 
the finance ministry proceeded to screen out firms for concerns ranging from cluster weapons to 
poor labor practices.
186
  It has developed novel, quasi-legal notions of complicity to support 
Norway‘s practice of ethical investment.187  GPFG has also engaged internationally alongside 
other SWFs, alongside private institutional investors, and directly in investor states, to advance a 
                                                 
180
 See Norway Ministry of Finance, Corporate Governance Webpage, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsible-
investments.html?id=446948 (last visited 1 June 2010). 
181
 NORWAY MINISTRY OF FINANCE, REPORT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND IN 2008, 4 
(4 Apr. 2009) available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/stmeld20_2008-
2009/report_no20_2009.pdf. 
182
 Gordon L. CLARK & Ashby H. B. MONK, The Legitimacy and Governance of Norway's Sovereign Wealth 
Fund: The Ethics of Global Investment, Working Paper (2010) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473973. 
183
 CHESTERMAN, supra note 12 at 584. 
184
 See U.N. Global Compact, About the Global Compact: The Ten Principles of the Global Compact, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited 1 June 2010). 
185
 CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 590; Norway Ministry of Finance, The Report From the Graver Committee § 
2.1 (11 July 2003), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsible-
investments/The-Graver-Committee---documents/Report-on-ethical-guidelines.html?id=420232 [hereinafter Graver 
Committee Report]  (unofficial English Translation). 
186
 CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 591; Kristin HALVORSEN, Norwegian Minister of Finance, speech at the 
2008 OECD Forum on Climate Change, Growth, Stability, Sovereign Wealth Funds (3-4 June 2008), transcript 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/57/40760305.pdf, at 2-3.   
187
 See CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 607 (arguing that the Council's colloquial use of the term "complicity" is 
―confusing, unnecessary, and unhelpful."). 
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framework for capital movements that is both ―responsible‖ in the public sense and hospitable to 
the fund as a profit-seeking investor.
188
 
 
The Norwegian SWF‘s experience with ethical global investment suggests that the fund‘s 
external responsibilities as a state actor are not the mechanical output of established treaty 
commitments and customary international law.  Instead, it is a complex product of international 
law, domestic and international politics, and global market socialization.  The resulting mix is 
particular to Norway, and is being projected internationally.  It is contested in many quarters, 
both by countries whose firms have been screened out,
189
 and those who have found themselves 
on the wrong side of Norway‘s market positions.  For example, when Norwegian SWF managers 
revealed that they were among the earliest in the market to bet against Icelandic banks using 
derivatives, some in Iceland suggested that it was an ethical failure on Norway‘s part ―to invest 
in a little-regulated market against the financial system of a neighboring country.‖190  On the 
other hand, echoing the progressive lawmaking potential of the Norwegian SWF, scholars have 
recently proposed using SWFs as vehicles to advance human rights in host countries.
191
  
 
Despite its renown and active international engagement, Norway does not give the definitive 
answer on the scope of SWFs‘ duties to the international system.  Considerable uncertainty 
remains about the substance and scope of responsibility, the role of ―complicity‖ and particularly 
SWFs‘ role as systemically significant actors in advancing global public good, including 
                                                 
188
 See GAPP, supra note 13; Press Release, Norges Bank, Norges Bank Contributes to U.N. Principles on 
Investments (27 Apr. 2006) available at http://www.nbim.no, /en/press-and-publications/News-List/2006/Norges-
Bank-contributes-to-UN-principles-on-investments/; Foreign Government Investment in the U.S. Economy and 
Financial Sector, Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade 
and Technology, and the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises, 110th Congress (5 Mar. 2008) (statement of Martin SKANCKE, Director General of the Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance) available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Vedlegg/aff/Congress_testimony_martin_skancke.pdf. 
189
 Mark LANDLER, Norway Keeps Nest Egg from Some U.S. Companies, New York Times, May 4, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/business/worldbusiness/04norway.html?fta=y&pagewanted=all. 
190
 Norwegian Oil Fund Betted Against Icelandic Economy, ICELAND REVIEW ONLINE, 23 May 2010, 
http://icelandreview.com/icelandreview/daily_news/?cat_id=16567&ew_0_a_id=362675; Ivar SIMENSEN, Norway 
Profits from Iceland, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 11 Apr. 2006; Asset-Backed Insecurity, THE ECONOMIST (London), Jan. 
17, 2008, at 386, available at http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10533428. 
191
 See Patrick J. KEENAN & Christiana OCHOA, The Human Rights Potential of Sovereign Wealth Funds (8 Apr. 
2009). Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 08-27; Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 132. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374880. 
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financial stability.  When observers extol SWFs‘ role as ―patient capital,‖192 does it follow that 
SWFs must refrain from aggressive trading?  When the United States asks China to invest 
commercially,
193
 does it still expect China Investment Corporation (CIC) to hold U.S. financial 
stocks in a credit crunch?  Here too transparency is a bone of contention: failure to disclose SWF 
positions can impede macroeconomic surveillance and potentially unsettle the markets; full 
disclosure might put SWFs at a disadvantage to their more opaque brethren and wholly private 
competitors.
194
 
 
D. Private External Accountability:  Chinese Bank Holdings 
 
While public external accountability captures SWFs‘ public duties as state actors operating 
transnationally, private external accountability keys off SWFs‘ claim that they are commercial 
actors in their hosts‘ markets.  Private firms investing abroad are subject to a range of legal 
constraints, from specialized foreign investment and regulatory regimes (corporate, securities, 
banking, environmental, food and drug) to generally applicable civil and criminal laws of their 
host states.
 195
  I noted in Part III that regulating sovereigns operating ―as private players‖ in 
foreign markets has long been a challenge for host governments.  Quite apart from questions of 
sovereign dignity, host laws make and enforce demands on private market participants in ways 
that may be ineffective or inappropriate to achieve the same ends with foreign governments.  
Early vocal concerns about SWF compliance with host country securities laws,
196
 along with 
proposals to adjust the hosts‘ tax and corporate laws to address SWF acquisitions,197 represent 
the latest round in a long debate over integrating state actors in private foreign markets.  The way 
in which this debate has evolved in U.S. bank regulation, culminating in a recent controversy 
over Chinese SWF investments, illustrates the work of private external accountability. 
 
                                                 
192
 See Mohamed EL ERIAN, Op-ed, Foreign Capital Must Not Be Blocked, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 3 
Oct. 2007 at 13. 
193
 See supra note 15. Similar agreements were reached with Singapore and Abu Dhabi. 
194
 Press Conference Call Transcript No. 08/01, International Working group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (Sept. 2, 
2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/tr.htm;  see also HALVORSEN, supra note 190, at 1-2. 
195
 E.g., ROSE, supra note 95. 
196
 COX, supra note 110. 
197
 FLEISCHER, supra note 109; GILSON & MILHAUPT, supra note 108. 
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The June 2008 meeting of U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue was getting hung up on an 
unlikely issue:  a bank license.  Dialogue meetings were launched several years earlier in 
response to concerns about bilateral imbalances; they had become high-level affairs at which top 
cabinet ministers sought to advance economic and security matters where U.S.-Chinese 
cooperation was key.  But on the eve of the June meeting, China had publicly expressed alarm 
over U.S. delays in approving two Chinese banks‘ applications to open branches in New York, 
suggesting ―a political ploy and part of a U.S. negotiating strategy‖ to gain advantage in the 
broader dialogue agenda.
198
 
 
From China‘s perspective, U.S. regulators must have looked improbably meddlesome and 
parochial.  The Federal Reserve had balked at what was essentially a domestic bureaucratic 
reshuffle in China, where the government had decided to make its bank holding SWF, Huijin, a 
subsidiary of CIC, the newer SWF with a broader mandate.
199
  From the Fed‘s perspective, this 
domestic change brought CIC squarely within the purview of the U.S. Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956 (―BHC Act‖), which subjects companies controlling U.S. banks to a special 
regulatory regime, including registration requirements, restrictions on transactions with affiliates, 
strict limits on non-banking and non-financial activities within the group, and Federal Reserve 
supervision.
200
  The BHC Act is part of a broader framework of U.S. laws separating banking 
from commerce, prudential regulations limiting risk to the federal deposit insurance fund, and 
policies addressing power concentration, conflicts of interest, credit allocation and community 
                                                 
198
 Jamil ANDERLINI & Geoff DYER, US Delays Licenses for China‟s Biggest Banks, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 
17 June 2008, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4dc9a06c-3bcb-11dd-9cb2-0000779fd2ac.html (last visited 20 June 2010). 
199
 See Federal Reserve Board, Order Approving Establishment of a Branch, fn. 3, (5 Aug. 2008) available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080805a1.pdf; Letter from Robert FRIERSON, 
Deputy Secretary, Federal Reserve Board, to H. Rodgin COHEN, Attorney, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (5 Aug. 
2008) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/BHC_ChangeInControl/2008/20080805.pdf 
(hereinafter Letter from FRIERSON).  CIC, established in September 2007 with $200 billion from central bank 
reserves, reports directly to the State Council of the People‘s Republic of China.  Its board is made up of officials 
from powerful government agencies. Brad W. SETSER, What to Do with Over Half a Trillion a Year?  
Understanding the Changes in the Management of China‟s Foreign Assets, RGE MONITOR, Jan. 18, 2008, available 
at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15294/what_to_do_with_over_a_half_a_trillion_a_year_understanding_the_changes
_in_the_management_of_chinas_foreign_assets.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F8937%2Fbrad_w_setser%3Fgroup
by%3D3%26hide%3D1%26id%3D8937%26filter%3D2008; see also MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS: CHINA‘S SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 26 (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34337.pdf.   CIC‘s holdings are currently estimated at $300 billion.  TRUMAN, 
THREAT OR SALVATION, supra note 19, at Table 1.1. 
200
 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (2006). 
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development.  This framework tries to insulate the insured depository institution from potential 
exploitation by the holding company and/or other affiliates, for example, restricting affiliates‘ 
capacity to use the bank as a cheap source of funds for their commercial or securities business.  
As a general purpose SWF reportedly modeled on Temasek,
201
 CIC could hardly refrain from 
non-financial investments altogether.  Moreover, since Huijin was already a bank holding 
company for U.S. purposes as a result of prior Chinese bank entries, the Fed‘s need for further 
regulating CIC was lost on its home authorities. 
 
Contrary to Chinese government suspicions, it is unlikely that the Federal Reserve used the bank 
holding company issue as a pretext to block Chinese bank entry, gain negotiating leverage, nor 
even as a way to slow the influx of Asian and Gulf interests in the U.S. financial sector.
202
  The 
Fed‘s approach came out of a thirty-year-old line of administrative decisions about the meaning 
of the word ―company‖ in the BHC Act, where U.S. regulators struggled with the implications of 
including and exempting state-owned firms.  The plain language of the BHC Act applies to a 
                                                 
201
 TRUMAN, THREAT OR SALVATION, supra note 19, at 5 (reporting that Temasek was a model for CIC).  CIC 
appears to have at least two public missions: to reform the Chinese banking sector and to boost returns on foreign 
exchange reserves.  The reorganization implicating Huijin complicated CIC‘s mandate.  ChinaStakes.com, A 
Simmering CIC-Huijin Separation, July 8, 2008, http://www.chinastakes.com/story.aspx?id=495 (last visited 14 
Sep. 2008).  Influential observers in the Chinese press debate other public goals, including fiscal stabilization and 
growing export markets.  Ashby H.B. MONK, Scott MOORE & Xunyi ‗Jane‘ XU, A Review of Chinese Language 
Literature on Sovereign Wealth Funds 11-12 (Oxford International Review Sovereign Wealth Funds Team Working 
Paper No. SWF001, 2008), available at http://oxfordir.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/swf001.pdf.   This is similar to 
the Russian debate about SWFs‘ public mandate, discussed in POPOVA, supra note 134. 
202
 Scott G. ALVAREZ, General Counsel for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Testimony 
Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology, and the 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial 
Services, U.S. House of Representatives (5 Mar. 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/alvarez20080305a.htm (elaborating the Federal Reserve‘s 
position on SWF bank acquisitions).  See Nour MALAS & Mirna SLEIMAN, Have Money, Will Travel, Wall Street 
Journal, 15 Mar. 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704187204575101690844355062.html 
(Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth funds have invested in Citigroup, Daimler AG, Advanced Micro Devices, and 
Barclays PLC); see also Katharina PISTOR, Global Network Finance (Am. Law & Econ. Ass‘n. 18th Annual 
Meeting, Working Paper No. 54, 2008), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2611&context=alea. 
 
Although the Federal Reserve‘s focus in this instance was on fairly technical issues state ownership, the broader 
legal regime for foreign bank entry, as well as the politics of Asian and Gulf state bank acquisitions in the United 
States were shaped in important part by the scandal surrounding the privately owned Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), which failed in 1991.  A sprawling, deliberately convoluted organization with ties to Abu 
Dhabi, Pakistan, and several offshore jurisdictions, BCCI had established a significant banking presence in the 
United Kingdom, the United States and continental Europe.  At the time of its failure, BCCI was implicated in 
money laundering, arms trading, and various other criminal schemes worldwide.   For an account of the BCCI affair 
and its impact on U.S. bank regulation and foreign bank entry, see generally, RAJ BHALA, FOREIGN BANK 
REGULATION AFTER BCCI (1994). 
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―company‖ that controls a U.S. bank or another bank holding company; however, the Act 
specifically exempts companies majority-owned by the U.S. federal and state governments.
203
  
Federal Reserve Board decisions going back to the 1970s affirm that foreign governments are not 
―companies‖ for purposes of the BHC Act, but refuse to extend the exemption afforded U.S. 
government-owned companies to companies owned by foreign governments.
204
  From the Fed‘s 
perspective, CIC‘s predicament was structurally identical to that of an Italian state bank holding 
company whose subsidiary sought to enter the United States twenty years earlier: 
[T]he issues raised by foreign government ownership of banks operating in the United 
States … present complex problems of the compatibility of the broad scope of 
commercial and industrial activities [of the Italian state holding company] with the stated 
purposes of the BHC Act -- preventing conflicts of interest, avoiding concentration of 
resources, and maintaining the safety and soundness of banks in the United States.
205
 
 
The policies behind the BHC Act demanded that a separately organized, diversified foreign 
―company‖ be regulated presumptively as a private market actor even if it were owned and 
controlled by a foreign state.  However, in deference to diplomatic and functional imperatives, 
the Federal Reserve was prepared to exempt a state-owned company from the strictest rules 
mandating separation of banking and commerce at the holding level, in exchange for contractual 
undertakings to restrict transactions with affiliates, refrain from cross-subsidies and cross-
marketing.
206
  In effect, U.S. regulators in 1988 had synthetically replicated the BHC Act regime 
                                                 
203
 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2006) (defining "bank holding company" as "any company which has control over any 
bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this Act."); 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) 
(2006) (defining "company" to mean "any corporation . . . partnership, business trust, association, or similar 
organization, or any other trust unless by its terms it must terminate within twenty-five years or not later than 
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include any corporation the majority of the shares of which are owned by the United States or by any State, and shall 
not include a qualified family partnership."). 
203
 See Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Company, 68 Federal Reserve Bulletin No. 7 (July 1982); 
Letter from William WILES, Secretary, Federal Reserve Board, to Patricia SKIGEN & John CAIRNS, Attorneys, 
Willkie, Farr & Gallagher (19 Aug. 1988) (hereinafter Letter from WILES). 
204
 Letter from WILES, supra note 203.  The Italian holding company, like Huijin, had been formed to recapitalize 
and reform domestic banks. Compare Supra Letter from WILES, with Letter from FRIERSON, supra note 203. 
205
 Letter from WILES, supra note 203; 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (2006) (granting Fed Board exemptive authority for 
―shares held or activities conducted by any company organized under the laws of a foreign country the greater part 
of whose business is conducted outside the United States, if the Board by regulation or order determines that, under 
the circumstances and subject to the conditions set forth in the regulation or order, the exemption would not be 
substantially at variance with the purposes of this Act and would be in the public interest …‖). 
206
 See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 203; Letter from FRIERSON, supra note 203 [granting Fed Board 
exemptive authority for ―shares held or activities conducted by any company organized under the laws of a foreign 
country the greater part of whose business is conducted outside the United States, if the Board by regulation or order 
determines that, under the circumstances and subject to the conditions set forth in the regulation or order, the 
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in the form of a conditional exemption for foreign state-owned firms, designed to protect U.S. 
depositors, taxpayers, and markets. 
 
The Fed ultimately granted the disputed Chinese bank applications in August 2008, on much the 
same terms and using the same exemptive authority as it had used for the Italian state firm in 
August 1988.
207
  CIC and Huijin both would be bank holding companies, but could continue 
investing in commercial firms so long as they lived by contractual commitments that walled off 
the banks operating in the U.S. market.  Since the decision, three Chinese banks have entered 
New York.  Together with earlier arrivals from China, they quickly became a force in U.S. 
corporate lending, partly replacing the newly cautious U.S. banks as credit providers to the host 
economy.
208
 
 
This relatively happy ending for the contest between internal and external accountability leaves 
open the question of enforcement.  Enforcement is key to structuring a private external 
accountability regime for SWFs, since sovereigns may have trouble credibly committing to 
comply and have means of evasion unavailable to private firms.  Ceremonial promises on the 
part of SWF to live by host laws that already apply to them
209
 look like feckless political theater.  
On the other hand, more muscular proposals to limit SWFs‘ capacity to ―act private‖ may have 
limited practical impact.  For example, formally suspending SWF shareholder voting rights to 
preempt noncommercial interference
210
 matters less when a SWF can credibly threaten to exit 
even on noncommercial terms, or when its finance minister can call the CEO or her host 
government counterparts.  Latent capacity to exert influence and get private information through 
government channels is a defining feature of sovereign investments; modifying corporate voting 
rules in a sense puts too much stock in SWF claims to private behavior, and too much faith in the 
traditional methods of private external accountability. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
exemption would not be substantially at variance with the purposes of this Act and would be in the public interest 
…‖] 
207
 See Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Company, 68 Federal Reserve Bulletin No. 7 (July 1982); 
Letter from FRIERSON, supra note 203. 
208
 Carolyn CUI, China Finds New Market for Loans:  U.S., Wall Street Journal (2 June 2010) available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703957604575273011917977450.html?KEYWORDS=cui. 
209
 See infra notes 220-221 and accompanying text.  
210
 GILSON & MILHAUPT, supra note 108, at 1352. 
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Furthermore, if the proposed restrictions were effective on their own terms, the normative 
assumptions behind them would still merit a closer look.  Is disenfranchising public shareholders 
(and thereby empowering the rest) good for host corporate governance?
211
  Does it serve 
government accountability in the home country?  More cynically, is depriving Russia of a formal 
shareholder vote worth giving up Norway‘s role in advancing international labor rights?  Put 
differently, boosting private external accountability in this way may detract from other 
dimensions of accountability. 
  
* * * 
In this Part, I have described SWFs as subject to four distinct kinds of demands for 
accountability.  A core argument of this Article is that such ―axes of accountability‖ define the 
SWF predicament, and do not stand in a clear hierarchical relationship to one another.  
Privileging one set of demands may reinforce or undermine the others, depending on the 
circumstances.  When the SWF phenomenon captured public attention at home and abroad, there 
was no generally accepted principle or process for resolving the conflicting demands.  The next 
Part addresses attempts to fill the gap with private, public and hybrid governance devices. 
 
V. Artifacts of Accountability:  Principle, Practice, Scoreboard and Index 
 
Early efforts to govern SWFs came in four basic forms.  First, domestic legislation in host states 
sought some combination of limiting SWF entry and securing their compliance with host laws 
applicable to market participants.
212
  As products of the revised open investment compromise, 
these formal measures were deliberately limited in scope and perspective.  Their priority was 
shielding the host states and their markets without driving away much-needed foreign investment 
or setting off a protectionist response.  Second, less formal statements by host state officials and 
some joint pronouncements with SWF sponsors articulated an additional layer of expectations, 
usually in the form of broad guiding principles, whose stated aim was to commit SWFs to 
                                                 
211
 Richard A. EPSTEIN & Amanda M. ROSE, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going 
Slow, 76 University of Chicago Law Review 111 (Winter 2009) (arguing against GILSON & MILHAUPT). 
212
 See supra Part III.B. 
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apolitical, professional, and law-abiding behavior.
213
  Third, formal international institutions and 
instruments had a surprisingly low profile from the start of the SWF debates.  This may have 
been due to a combination of the OECD‘s legitimacy crisis after MAI and its limited 
membership, excluding almost all key SWF sponsors,
214
 coupled with the IMF‘s ambiguous 
authority over the capital account.
215
  Fourth, work by non-government actors to define SWFs
216
 
often carried an embedded governance agenda.  Their products ranged from research reports that 
sought to shape the category and make up for the lack of SWF disclosure
217
 to more explicit 
evaluations that resembled established private ratings of government transparency and business 
environment.
218
  Although their content is largely geared to structure and process, such private 
efforts have influenced both the substance of the emerging hybrid international regime to govern 
SWFs and the behavior of SWFs themselves.  This Part analyzes the relationship among the four 
forms of governance, highlighting the outsize influence of private approaches on the emerging 
hybrid regime.  I suggest that this influence is due in part to the capacity of private designs to 
capture the accountability demands elaborated in Part IV. 
 
The passage of the 2007 investment legislation in the United States was a definitive 
accomplishment in one respect:  preserving the open investment status quo in the face of strong 
opposition in a hostile economic and political climate.  Since it was prompted by SOE 
acquisitions and addressed the national security implications of government-controlled 
                                                 
213
 KIMMITT, Public Footprints, supra note 31; Clay LOWERY, Acting Under Secretary for International Affairs, 
Remarks at Barclays Capital's 12th Annual Global Inflation-Linked Conference, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 25 Feb. 
2008, at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp836.htm; Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury 
Reaches Agreement on Principles for Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment with Singapore and Abu Dhabi (Mar. 20, 
2008) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp881.htm. 
214
 See supra Part III; OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, List of OECD member countries, 
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215
 See e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE, THE IMF‘S APPROACH TO 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION 3 (2005) available at http://www.ieo-
imf.org/eval/complete/pdf/04202005/report.pdf. 
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218
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countries); Millennium Challenge Corporation, http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/about/index.shtml (last visited 26 June 
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investment, the law did not aspire to, or achieve, an overall vision for SWF governance.  As new 
legislative initiatives floundered, the affirmative case was left entirely to nonbinding 
pronouncements, such as G-8 and G-7 communiqués calling for SWF ―best practices‖ while 
reaffirming the hosts‘ commitment to open investment,219 and statements of general principles by 
U.S. Treasury and European Commission officials.
220
  In March 2008, the United States, 
Singapore and Abu Dhabi issued a joint statement of ―policy principles‖ for SWFs and their 
hosts, to serve as the basis for the work on ―voluntary best practices‖ pursued in multilateral 
fora.
221
  The principles called on SWFs to commit to act commercially, to ramp up their public 
disclosure of market-relevant information, to professionalize their management and internal 
controls, and to abide by host country laws.  In return, host countries would refrain from 
protectionism, discrimination and interference.
222
  It is hard to assess the political impact of such 
statements; as a legal matter, they added little if anything to the parties‘ existing obligations.  
And the vagueness did not obscure sensitive detail—rather, the absence thereof. 
 
Much of the operational content for SWF governance first appeared in a ―scoreboard‖ proposed 
by Edwin M. Truman of the Peterson Institute of International Economics.  Truman, formerly a 
senior U.S. finance official, published a series of comments and policy briefs in 2007 and 2008 
specifically geared to influence U.S. and international policy design.  Truman‘s treatment of 
SWFs differed in important ways from other policy and academic writing of the day.  Beyond 
taking sides in the hosts‘ internal security-protectionism quarrel,223 Truman used the definitional 
and governance ambiguity that characterized SWFs to articulate the need for broad-based 
accountability, including recognition of the funds‘ duties to ―their citizens, the markets, and the 
                                                 
219
 G-8 Summit Declaration, Growth & Responsibility in the World Economy, at 4-8 (7 June 2007) available at 
http://www.g-8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/anlagen/2007-06-07-gipfeldokument-wirtschaft-
eng,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/2007-06-07-gipfeldokument-wirtschaft-eng.pdf; Statement of the 
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 See LOWERY, supra note 31; KIMMITT Public Footprints, supra note 31. 
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general public, including outside the country.‖224  By defining SWFs to include government 
pension funds, Truman both sought to hold SWFs to a higher standard, and to make incipient 
SWF norms more broadly relevant to all very large global investors.  His first ―blueprint‖ for 
SWF best practices comprised Structure, Governance, Accountability and Transparency, and 
Behavior prongs; compliance was evaluated based on Yes/No answers to thirty-three questions, 
using publicly available disclosure.  Defining SWFs broadly to include Northern and Western 
pension funds gavethe resulting ―scoreboard‖ some pragmatic credibility: at least one fund could 
answer ―Yes‖ to at least one of the thirty-three questions, which could then claim to reflect 
existing practice.  The scoreboard rewarded clear and separate organization, funding and 
decision-making transparency, regular public reporting, independent audits, and policies relevant 
to financial stability, such as the use of leverage and derivatives.  It ranked SWFs on a 100-point 
scale.  Pension funds as a group did better than non-pension funds, but with considerable 
variation within group scores.
225
 
 
At about the same time, the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, an information hub run by U.S. 
entrepreneurs Carl Linaburg and Michael Maduell, released a SWF transparency index that 
measured some of the same factors as Truman‘s scoreboard, but was designed to deliver 
information to market participants and the media, rather than push policy making.  The 
Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index (LMTI) defines SWFs to include several traditional 
reserve management vehicles, and scores all funds on a ten-point scale based on ten equally 
weighed questions.  Like Truman, Linaburg and Maduell gave higher scores for clear 
organization and regular, independent disclosure.  On the other hand, they bundled some factors 
that Truman had disaggregated (such as disclosure of ethical and investment policies), sought 
less information in fewer categories (hence no questions on leverage policies or the timing of 
audit disclosure), and weighed factors such as publishing the SWF‘s address and telephone 
number on par with audited annual reports.
226
  Theirs was broadly accessible transparency 
                                                 
224
 TRUMAN, Sovereign Wealth Funds:  The Need for Greater Transparency and Accountability, Peterson Institute 
for International Economics Policy Brief PB07-6 (Aug. 2007) at 8. 
225
 TRUMAN, Blueprint, supra note 29, at App‘x A, Tbl. A1 (Apr. 2008) available at 
http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb08-3.pdf. 
226
 SWF Institute, Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, http://www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-research/linaburg-
maduell-transparency-index/ (last visited 25 June 2010). 
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shorthand, not a granular governance device.  Funds such as ADIA and Mubadala did markedly 
better under LMTI than under the scoreboard; Canada did worse. 
 
Both the scoreboard and the index caught on quickly among market participants, policy makers, 
and SWFs alike.  They offered the hosts a metric for a category that was anything but unified, yet 
was publicly perceived as such.  They also provided a tangible means to ground or dispel what 
had been inchoate host country fears:
227
  if one bought into the metric, a high-scoring fund 
should be welcomed, a low-scoring one should be shunned, and host laws should be designed to 
prod funds to improve their scores.  For the SWFs, these private devices finally offered a 
standard to live up to, contest, or negotiate.  Since the scoreboard and index were launched, 
SWFs have publicized their high rankings, challenged low ones, and engaged with the 
researchers on inputs and methodology.
228
  Thus both the Truman scoreboard and LMTI took on 
governance functions.  Overall, rankings have gone up since 2008;
229
 whether this is due to 
materially better practices or ranking arbitrage is an interesting question beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 
The diffusion of private governance devices did not dispense with the public governance 
problem.  Having charged the OECD and the IMF in 2007 with brokering agreement on conduct 
norms for SWFs‘ hosts and sponsors, the G-8 awaited a product that could be publicly accepted 
as a governance vehicle by the relevant governments and market participants.  Neither the OECD 
nor the IMF was ideally suited to the task. 
 
The OECD‘s initial reactions to the SWF controversy were as baffled as those of the SWFs 
themselves.  Its earliest statements on SWFs highlighted existing international accords going 
                                                 
227
 See supra Part III.B  (discussing the variety of fears expressed during times of crises by host countries, including 
fear of foreign control and indebtedness). 
228
 See, e.g., Norway Ministry of Finance, The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2009, Report No. 
10, 142-43 (2009-2010) available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2500165/PDFS/STM200920100010000EN_PDFS.pdf; SOFAZ ranks high in 
Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, NEWS.AZ (4 Nov. 2009) available at http://www.news.az/articles/1572. 
229
  Compare Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index 1st Quarter 2008, 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/q12008transparency.php (last visited 27 June 2010) (showing two SWFs with 
the top transparency score of 10—18 over 5) with 3rd Quarter 2008 LMTI ratings, 
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back to the 1960s, which committed signatories to progressive liberalization, non-discrimination 
and transparency, and carved out a narrow exception for ―essential national security interests,‖ to 
be exercised with restraint and transparency by the investment hosts.
230
  Before it got the specific 
mandate to come up with rules for SWF hosts, the OECD‘s public statements implied that SWFs 
simply did not present a new issue.  Government ownership was not an excuse to deviate from 
investment liberalization or invoke national security exceptions.  Existing guidelines for 
invoking the exceptions were sufficient to accommodate SWFs.
231
  A series of roundtables for 
members and invited guests might help reinforce and disseminate the norms, but would not alter 
the regime.
232
  In mid-2008, the OECD adopted a declaration on SWFs; later the same year it 
issued Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies meant to cabin the use of national 
security exceptions
233—both instruments in substance reiterated the OECD position that SWFs 
presented no new or distinct policy challenge.  This position may have been principled as a 
formal matter, but it failed to respond to the political imperative, or leverage the process in any 
way.  For better or worse, the public in a growing number of host and home countries had come 
to see SWFs as new and distinct, if only because they embodied the new financial and security 
landscape.
234
  Moreover, faced with the prospect of broad-based investment restrictions, the 
SWFs themselves were poised to concede the point to get stable market access. 
 
The IMF was both a natural and an unlikely candidate to come up with norms to govern SWFs.  
Its macroeconomic and financial stability expertise made the IMF uniquely credible in 
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addressing issues of concern to home and host states alike.  It knew all the actors involved
235
 and 
had analyzed the advent of SWFs for some time.
236
  Unlike the OECD, the Fund‘s membership 
was nearly universal, though its internal governance remained controversial.
237
  The IMF had 
jurisdiction over its members‘ exchange rate policies, current account convertibility, and broad 
macroeconomic and financial policy responsibility.  However, its authority over capital flows, 
including investment, was partial, ambiguous, and worse for wear since the capital account crises 
of the 1990s and early 2000s.
238
  As noted earlier, the Fund‘s recent surveillance record had been 
mixed at best.
239
  It did little to reduce the imbalances that spawned the new wave of SWFs.  
 
In a paradox that would repeat itself in the ensuing months, the Fund‘s lack of legal and 
economic power over surplus states with SWFs might have helped make its involvement more 
palatable to them.  It got tagged to help leading SWFs distil ―best practices‖ for going about their 
business by way of compromise at its 2007 Annual Meetings.
240
  Prodded by the G-7, the IMF 
envisaged something along the lines of its prior forays into best practices for fiscal transparency 
and reserve management.
241
  Yet the new project was quite different.  In contrast to its prior 
code-making experiences, the IMF did not come to the table with authority to determine the 
standards, assess compliance, or sanction noncompliance.  It dealt with states that by definition 
did not need its money and were unlikely to need it in the foreseeable future.  The IMF‘s 
functions were expert, convening, and secretarial.  The output was emphatically voluntary.
242
  
Meanwhile, reports on SWFs‘ enthusiasm for the exercise were not encouraging.  Soon after 
receiving the assignment, one IMF official reported that the word ―best‖ in ―best practices‖ was 
too controversial for the new gathering. 
                                                 
235
 NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THEIR BORROWERS 4 (2006) (linking the 
IMF‘s policy influence and its long-standing relationships with world governments). 
236
 See, e.g., generally, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 24. 
237
 See supra III.A; see also Press Release, International Monetary Fund, Directors Back Reforms to Overhaul IMF 
Quotas and Voice (Mar. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/NEW032808A.htm. 
238
 See e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE, supra note 219. 
239
 See supra III.A; BUREAU OF INT‘L AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 72 (stating that the IMF‘s 
―implementation of the new decision can be viewed as mixed.‖). 
240
 Press Release No. 08/78, International Monetary Fund, Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (Apr. 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr0878.htm.   
241
 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 25, at 22. 
242
 See Press Conference Call Transcript, supra note 198. 
Draft July 19, 2010 
Forthcoming in Asian Journal of International Law 
 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1639119 
 
52 
 
Nevertheless, an International Working Group (IWG) made up of two dozen or so states with 
SWFs
243
 negotiated the Santiago Principles between May and September 2008.  They met three 
times, in Washington, Singapore and Chile, and had a drafting session in Norway.  The group 
was chaired by two senior officials, one from ADIA and another from the IMF.  Several home 
and host countries, along with representatives of the OECD, the World Bank, and the European 
Union, attended IWG meetings as observers.  Some major host states, including the United 
States, attended as SWF sponsors in their own right.
244
  The group‘s agreement was announced 
at the meeting in Santiago on September 2, 2008.  IWG member governments quickly signed off 
on the Santiago Principles text, whereupon it was presented to the IMF‘s policy-setting 
International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and the general IMF membership.
245
  
A ritual welcome followed. 
 
The principles do not claim to be the ―best,‖ but they do aspire to be ―generally accepted‖, where 
―general‖ means ―potentially achievable by countries at all levels of economic development.‖246  
This gesture of solidarity across the income spectrum suggests a governance grouping distinct 
from the ―Gs‖ that came before.  Unlike the old G-7 and the G-77, which reflected national 
income and reinforced something like class stratification among states, and even unlike the G-20, 
which was designed to mimic diverse representation of wealthy and middle income countries, the 
Santiago Principles seem to address a more organically diverse constituency, united by the 
functional needs of surplus states operating in integrated financial markets. 
 
When they were issued, the Principles projected concern with SWFs‘ status at home and abroad, 
and their competitiveness in the private financial markets.  They suggested that SWFs still 
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occupied a contested place in home country politics and policy mix, and projected a continued 
sense that SWFs‘ decision-making was poorly understood and worrisome to the hosts – but also 
a suspicion on the part of many funds that they operated on hostile, unfamiliar turf that might tilt 
in favor of private and public competitors.  The IWG product sought to reassure, but not at the 
expense of losing autonomy or competitive edge.  
 
Much like Truman‘s scoreboard, the two dozen GAPP line items address the structure and 
objectives of SWFs (―legal, institutional and macroeconomic‖ factors), their governance 
practices (especially decision autonomy from the home government) and their investment and 
risk management policies, focusing on financial stability.
247
  The document is suffused with 
accountability rhetoric, which is cited in support of all but a few of the two dozen principles.  At 
the same time, the Santiago Principles take a particular view of accountability that is distinct 
from earlier public statements by SWF and host governments, the scoreboard, or any other 
governance device.  Viewed through the framework set out in Part IV of this Article, the IWG 
went the farthest in private accountability—internally, answering to SWFs‘ stakeholders under 
the terms of their constitutive arrangements,
248
 and externally, abiding by the laws their hosts 
made applicable to similarly situated (generally defined as private) investors,
249
 while 
participating in the global financial markets in the manner of profit-driven private investors.
250
  
GAPP Principle 21 (GAPP 21) takes a forceful stand on SWFs‘ shareholder rights.  In this view, 
SWFs capacity to exercise shareholder rights in their investments is an essential attribute of 
accountability to their own stakeholders.  The way in which IWG approached this principle 
illustrates the tension between internal and external private accountability.  On balance, GAPP 
21 was a clear victory for internal accountability; however, in a nod to the external audience, the 
SWFs agreed to disclose their voting policies and intentions ex ante and their voting record ex 
post. 
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The Principles address public internal accountability primarily through disclosure; however, 
some of the most significant disclosure is made to the owner, not the domestic public, blurring 
the line between private and public accountability and effectively relying on general government 
channels to inform the populace and the world at large.
251
  To the consternation of many long-
time observers, and in notable contrast with Truman‘s scoreboard, IWG deemed total fund size 
too sensitive to require disclosure at all—one reason why GAPP as a package scores only 76 out 
of 100 on the scoreboard.
252
  Some of the most forceful language in the Principles is used to 
disclaim ―any intention or obligation to fulfill, directly or indirectly, any geopolitical agenda of 
the government‖253—presumably, even if the public at home demands it.  It is almost as if the 
SWFs sought to use the Santiago Principles as a commitment device for their own governments 
and publics, making it harder to appropriate the funds for public purpose distinct from their 
stated mission. 
 
The treatment of public external accountability is similarly strained.  Over half of all the 
Principles refer to the sentiment most clearly expressed in GAPP 19:  SWFs are in the business 
of maximizing ―risk-adjusted returns‖ and operate solely ―based on economic and financial 
grounds‖.  Any social, ethical or religious motive is a deviation from the group norm (albeit one 
in which some important members like Kuwait and Norway engage), which must be specifically 
disclosed.  Moreover, many of the disclosure obligations elsewhere in the document are justified 
in terms of dispelling ―concern about potential noneconomic or nonfinancial objectives.‖254  The 
funds‘ contribution to global financial stability comes not of a sense of public duty, but rather of 
their capacity and inclination—by virtue of their economic objective and structure—―to take a 
long-term view in their investments and ride out business cycles.‖255 
 
When IWG announced agreement on the Santiago Principles, its members were at pains to 
disassociate them from the IMF surveillance process: they insisted that everything about the 
principles was voluntary.  Perhaps as a matter of preemption, the Santiago Principles 
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incorporated a periodic internal review mechanism.
256
  In theory, nothing prevents the IMF from 
considering GAPP criteria in its assessment of home and host policies implicating SWFs, just as 
nothing prevents a host government from using GAPP as part of its investment screen.
257
  But 
doing so may undermine the Principles‘ legitimacy in the home countries, and scuttle 
cooperation between new and old powers and institutions. 
 
IWG work since the launch in Santiago confirms the view of the forum as, at least in part, an 
exercise in governance preemption.  In the fall of 2008, the IWG secretariat released a SWF 
survey, reacting to calls for transparency while seizing initiative and asserting control in a field 
where authoritative information was scarce and analysis was dominated by private investment 
banks and consultancies.
258
 Six months after presenting the Principles to the IMFC, the group 
released the Kuwait Declaration establishing a standing forum of SWFs.  IWG‘s successor, the 
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) is ―a voluntary group of SWFs‖ whose 
membership is open to funds that meet the GAPP definition of SWF and, significantly, ―endorse‖ 
the Principles.  It is a soft institutional counterpart to the emphatically soft law of the Santiago 
Principles.  The IMF has served as the Forum‘s interim secretariat.259  Since its establishment, 
the IFSWF has met twice, in Azerbaijan and Australia.  It has issued statements advocating open 
investment, and has brokered a code of ―good practices‖ on investment risk management, 
conducting member surveys as part of the process.
260
  The current forum Chair is from Australia; 
Deputy Chairs represent China‘s and Kuwait‘s SWFs. 
 
The IWG and IFSWF effort so far builds on and borrows elements of several established species:  
best practices produced by and for the public sector (for example, IMF on fiscal transparency), 
                                                 
256
 Press Conference Call Transcript, supra note 29. 
257
 Before the Santiago Principles were unveiled, some members of the U.S. Congress suggested using CFIUS 
review to encourage SWF compliance with best practices.  See Press Release, House Financial Services Committee, 
Frank, Maloney, Gutierrez Call on Treasury to Address Sovereign Wealth Funds in FINSA Regulations, March 13, 
2008, available at http://financialservices.house.gov/press110/press0313082.shtml; TRUMAN, THREAT OR 
SALVATION, supra note 19, at 100. 
258
 Sovereign Wealth Funds:  Current Institutional and Operational Practices (Sep. 15, 2008), available at  
http://iwg-swf.org/pubs/swfsurvey.pdf.  SETSER REPORT, supra note 9, at 40 (noting a decline in transparency). 
259
 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, “Kuwait Declaration”: Establishment of the 
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Apr. 6, 2009, at www.iwg-wf.org/mis/kuwaitdec.htm.  
260
 Int‘l Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds Issue “Baku Statement” Reaffirming the Need 
for Maintaining Open Investment Environment, 9 Oct. 2009, at http://www.ifswf.org/pr/pr2.htm. 
Draft July 19, 2010 
Forthcoming in Asian Journal of International Law 
 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1639119 
 
56 
corporate codes of conduct produced by the private sector to regulate itself,
261
 and principles 
jointly produced by public and private actors to regulate private conduct (for example, the 
Equator Principles, a collaboration between private banks and the International Finance 
Corporation).  GAPP is unusual because the principles are produced by and for public entities, 
yet they purport to regulate market activity.
262
  ―Governments as market actors‖263 favor self-
regulation. 
 
IFSWF combines features of a macroeconomic policy coordination body (the G-7) and a 
producer‘s cartel (OPEC).  It is more like the latter in the sense that group members appear to be 
SWFs themselves, not their sponsoring governments
264—and to the extent there is daylight 
between general government interests and those of the SWFs, the latter but rarely the former are 
represented in regular meetings.  But the IFSWF‘s regulatory and self-regulatory aspirations also 
evoke the rise of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), a group of public and private regulators 
and standard setters formed in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s, which 
was re-launched and given a prominent role in the regulatory reform proposals coming out of the 
current crisis.
265
  Neither has legal personality or much of an infrastructure; yet both have 
charter-like mandates, norm-generating authority, and enough of an organizational chart to fit 
somewhere in between bureaucratic networks
266
 and full-fledged international institutions on the 
Bretton Woods model.
267
  Time will tell which analogy fits best, if any.  However, the IWG‘s 
decision to stick around and morph into IFSWF is further evidence of the surplus countries‘ 
taking ownership of what started in their view as a made-up category, and using it as a vehicle 
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not just to allay deficit country fears, but more importantly, to advance their own interests and 
participate in the governance of international finance. 
 
VI. Conclusion:  SWF Governance as an Experiment and a Lens 
 
This Article has described how an apparently artificial grouping of investors, made salient by the 
particular historical and political circumstances of their host states in the mid-2000s, became a 
vehicle for addressing some of the hardest policy problems of the past century and a site for 
innovation in international law-making and institution-building.  I have argued that the funds‘ 
common quality—their hybrid public-private and transnational character—makes them hard to 
define and govern, but also makes them exceptionally apt reflections of contemporary global 
finance and its multiple constituents.  I have sought to capture this quality in the four-part 
accountability matrix elaborated in Part IV.  From this perspective, the task of governing SWFs, 
just like the task of governing global finance, is about negotiating among public, private, internal 
and external demands for accountability in the absence of a clear normative hierarchy among 
them, and with no prospect for the emergence of such a hierarchy.  The goal is to establish a 
dynamic governance process, capable of winning legitimacy simultaneously in radically different 
political, economic and cultural settings. 
 
This governance project might draw on, and contribute to, several fields of law scholarship that 
have struggled with some of its constituent challenges.  First, writing on legal pluralism and, 
more recently, on global legal pluralism, has worked with cultural difference, the simultaneous 
application of diverse legal regimes to a single subject, and conflicting accountability demands 
on administrative actors.
268
  However, legal pluralism and to a lesser extent its global 
counterpart, often come rooted in colonial hierarchies, and in a sharp distinction between state 
and non-state law.  SWFs offer an example of state-made law dislodged from its privileged 
position, embracing informality as a core part of their identity as regulators and regulated 
                                                 
268
 See Ralf MICHAELS, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL SCIENCE 243 (2009) (a 
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(2006). 
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subjects.  Second, the GAPP and IFSWF projects evoke elements of the large literature on New 
Governance, described in the financial regulatory setting as a regime ―that uses innovative, 
pragmatic, information-based, iterative, and dialogic mechanisms to gather, distill, and leverage 
industry learning in the service of … more effective and less burdensome … public regulatory 
mandate.‖269  The absence of a stable hierarchy, the iterative and information-channeling 
functions of IFSWF, the incorporation of private knowledge, methods and artifacts in GAPP, and 
SWFs‘ simultaneous struggle for legitimacy in multiple diverse settings, make the comparison 
fruitful.  Here too SWFs enrich the cast of law-making characters, usually conceived of as a 
dynamic combination of public and private players learning from one another, less often as one 
set of players ―performing‖ the other (sovereigns as market actors).  Third, the resurgent 
literature on soft law, particularly soft law in international finance,
270
 responds to persistent 
criticisms of the Santiago Principles as nonbinding.
271
  This scholarship implies that such 
criticism can be misleading in light of the weak compliance machinery in the most formally 
―binding‖ international legal arrangements, and the impressive compliance pull of embedded 
market discipline, competition, and process institutionalization.  SWFs, which compete 
vigorously in the market but also increasingly co-finance with one another,
272
 exemplify all three 
features.  Moreover, political scientists writing about soft law have praised its unique capacity to 
deal with uncertainty and diversity of interests, values and power.
273
  The alternative to soft law 
in this view is not hard law, but no law at all.  Whether no law is better depends on the behavior 
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of SWFs going forward and the eventual success of GAPP and IFSWF, as measured by their 
domestic and external legitimacy. 
  
A fuller examination of SWFs in relation to these theories and others is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Rather, the list suggests that much more work remains to be done by legal scholars to 
exploit the theoretical potential of SWFs, and to contribute to their governance.  Much of the 
early U.S. law literature on SWFs hewed closely to the policy problem as framed by domestic 
legislative debates.  It took the host perspective and argued either the national security or the 
open investment brief.
274
  Backer
275
 and Pistor
276
 were among the first to reject this framing and 
explore the broader governance import of SWFs—but scholars have not yet exhausted the 
category‘s potential. 
 
Meanwhile, from the policy perspective, it is tempting to see the Santiago Principles as an 
exercise in technocratic legitimation—a set of light and general rules to help Chinese, Russian 
and Arab money look friendlier to its U.S. and European hosts, while maintaining the mandate to 
invest from the masses at home.
277
  This undersells the achievement even with the limited 
implementation record to date.  At a minimum, the negotiation process revealed a new role for 
the IMF in financial diplomacy:  a shift from the hard power of conditionality in the 20
th
 century 
to the soft power of persuasion and expertise in the 21
st
.  In the world of soft power, brokering an 
investment compromise is a step up from technical assistance.  The financial crisis has reinforced 
the IMF‘s role as a source of balance-of-payments support, and has more than doubled its 
resources.  On the other hand, the rise of the FSB—a soft institution without the IMF‘s baggage, 
charter and funding constraints, but with a huge mandate from the G-20—brought real 
competition to governing finance.  The interactions between the IMF and the IFSWF may reveal 
new modes of cooperation between formal and informal governance arrangements.  More 
ambitiously, the Santiago experiment may yet launch a durable policy coordination regime 
among key actors who had trouble coming on stage in the 20
th
 century institutional framework.  
Ad-hoc, interest-based groupings such as the IFSWF, horizontally linked with established 
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institutions such as the IMF, may offer a new model to complement the G-20 and further 
displace the old G-7 order. 
 
Just as easily, the Santiago Principles could fail.  They may turn out to be too vague or too stingy 
to reassure the hosts, too restrictive to bind a set of very diverse and very rich actors whose 
interests often conflict, or too radical to coexist with tightly controlled domestic political 
regimes.  More likely, if the principles succeed at fostering model corporate governance and 
transparency, the (still-hypothetical) threats that prompted GAPP‘s creation may assume 
different form – shifting out of SWFs into reserve pools, state-owned enterprises, or new 
vehicles as yet unknown.  The GAPP model would still be out there, but it would apply to an 
unimportant fringe of sovereign finance. 
 
Whatever the outcome, the Santiago Principles implicate substantive issues that have been at the 
core of governing global finance for over half a century, and have launched legal and 
institutional experiments with implications far beyond their SWF signatories.  Meanwhile, SWFs 
have gone from a seemingly incongruous fiction fueled by worried Western politicians to 
catalysts for negotiating the terms of integration and governance among different political, social 
and economic systems—Saudi Arabia, Brazil, China and Norway, and their hosts in the United 
States, Europe and Africa.  This alone is an impressive achievement that merits further study. 
